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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The standard approach to normative institutional analysis involves crafting a model based on a given 
set of assumptions, deriving the consequences of that model, and comparing those consequences to 
some more or less specified conception of a desirable outcome. A small but influential group of 
political economists have rejected this approach, arguing instead that we should place extra weight on 
particularly bad outcomes. The central idea of robust political economy is that we should not evaluate 
institutions primarily on how they behave under normal conditions but on their ability to avoid 
disaster.  
The aim of this thesis is to reveal the strengths and limitations of the robust political economy 
approach and to develop a more subtle version sensitive to the messy reality of the real world. To do 
so, I will use the robustness paradigm to deal with substantive issues in political economy before 
arguing that the normative world is not as straightforward as implied by the prevailing conception of 
robust political economy and normative institutional analysis more generally.  
Institutions alter outcomes along many dimensions and the exact nature of change will often be 
uncertain and context-dependent. Further, the normative implications of institutions are 
multidimensional and inherently incommensurable. Ultimately, the factors complicating normative 
institutional analysis require that the political economist wishing to reach normative conclusions 
engage in indeterminate moral argument, rather than reaching hard scientific conclusions. In short, 
normative economics needs to give up its pretensions of value-freedom and its algorithmic process of 
evaluation.  
This chapter will detail the history and rationale of robust political economy and provide an outline of 
the chapters to come.     
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1.2.  ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The idea of robustness is well-developed in the fields of statistics, engineering, ecology, and biology 
(Jen 2005; Carlson & Doyle 2002). While the specific understandings of what makes a system robust 
varies by context and theorist, the central idea is that a system is robust when desired system 
characteristics are maintained in the face of external shocks and/or the misspecification of internal 
parameters. External shocks are of potential relevance to any open system, while parameter 
misspecification is of relevance only to systems which are designed or selected based on some theory.  
There are, broadly speaking, two aspects of robustness in this sense: the maintenance of particular 
characteristics and the maintenance of desirable performance. If the first aspect is emphasized, 
robustness becomes synonymous with stability: a system is robust to the extent that it is insensitive to 
external shocks and internal uncertainty. The view of robustness taken in this thesis is focused 
primarily on the second aspect: a system is robust to the extent that it continues to perform well under 
a variety of conditions. Robust political economy is the idea that political institutions should be 
evaluated not only on how they behave under best-case assumptions or our best estimate of which 
assumptions actually hold but also under worst-case assumptions. An institution is robust to the extent 
that it continues to perform well in the face of adverse conditions and mistaken theoretical 
assumptions. Taking this view, robustness and stability can each exist in a system without the other. A 
system which is highly responsive to change could simultaneously be very unstable and very robust. 
A system of polycentric law, for example, may be constantly rearranging itself as conditions change 
while maintaining a high level of citizen welfare. Conversely, a totalitarian regime may maintain its 
essential characteristics in the face of external shocks through harsh repression, being simultaneously 
stable and non-robust.  
The idea, though not the language, of robustness has a long history in political economy and has been 
of increasing interest to scholars in the public choice and Austrian schools of economics. The central 
tenet of robust political economy can be identified in the work of David Hume (1739), Adam Smith 
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(1759, 1776), John Stuart Mill (1861, 1869), and F.A. Hayek (1949). Mill‘s warnings against naïve 
confidence in human nature are a good example: 
Whether the institution to be defended is slavery, political absolutism, or the 
absolutism of the head of a family, we are always expected to judge of it from its 
best instances …Who doubts that there may be great goodness, and great 
happiness, and great affection, under the absolute government of a good man? 
Meanwhile, laws and institutions require to be adapted, not to good men, but to 
bad. (Mill 1869: Ch. 2)  
[T]he very principle of constitutional government requires it to be assumed that 
political power will be abused to promote the particular purposes of the holder; not 
because it always is so, but because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard 
against which is the especial use of free institutions.(Mill 1861: Ch. 12) 
 
Adam Smith‘s body of work, when considered as a whole, is perhaps the best classical example of 
robust political economy. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argues that people have 
significant concern for others. In The Wealth of Nations, he shows that even if people were selfish, a 
market order would produce generally beneficial outcomes. That is, the market is robust to the 
existence of knaves.  
The idea also seems to have had some genuine political impact, with James Madison‘s celebrated 
warning in Federalist 51 against treating rulers as angels. The common theme which unites these 
thinkers is the importance of distinguishing between the best empirical model from the most prudent 
model for institutional choice, with the latter being systematically more pessimistic than the former. 
While we may believe people to be angelic, or at least basically moral, a robust institution allows us 
to hedge our bets by containing the damage inflicted by knaves. 
This line of reasoning has been developed most fully by Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan 
(1981, 1983, 1999, 2000). In recent years, the idea has been taken up by a number of other political 
economists (Anderies et al 2004; Beaulier & Subrick 2006; Boettke 2000; Boettke & Leeson 2004, 
2006; Boettke & López 2002; Boettke et al 2005; Crampton & Farrant 2006, 2008; Farrant 2004; 
Farrant & Paganelli 2005; Janssen et al 2007; Leeson & Subrick 2006; Leeson et al 2006; Levy 2002; 
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Levy & Peart 2006; Subrick 2006; Taylor & Crampton 2009; Voigt 2006; Wagner 2006; Walsh 
2005).  
A robust institution will often perform more poorly than a fragile one under ideal conditions but 
proves its worth when conditions deteriorate. Absolute government power, for example, is preferable 
to constrained government when governors are wise and benevolent. As soon as we relax either 
assumption, though, absolute power begins to become very harmful. The price we pay for robustness 
is the frustration of wise and benevolent rulers (Brennan & Buchanan 1999: 62). The higher levels of 
economic freedom in authoritarian capitalist East Asian countries than in western democracies show 
that unconstrained government can promote freedom. The disastrous performance of other autocracies 
shows that such wise management should not be relied upon.  
David Levy (2002) likens Brennan and Buchanan‘s robust political economy to John Tukey‘s Robust 
Statistics. A robust statistical technique is one which continues to perform adequately when its central 
assumptions, such as normality of the data, are false. Similarly, a political institution is robust when it 
continues to perform adequately when its central assumptions, such as the benevolence of politicians, 
are false. For Levy, a robust institution is one in which the harm from deviations from best-case 
assumptions is bounded. The suboptimal performance of robust institutions when best-case 
assumptions do hold is analogous to the insurance premium we must pay if we wish to avoid greater 
hardship should the worst case ever eventuate.  
Levy offers a simple diagrammatic representation of institutional robustness, which graphs the 
desirability of a given institution (―good stuff,‖ as Levy calls it) as a function of the deviation from 
ideal assumptions. Figure 1.1 shows Levy‘s basic model, with institution B performing better than A 
under ideal conditions but being far more fragile to deviations from best-case assumptions. 
7 
 
Figure 1.1: Levy's Robustness Model 
 
―Good Stuff‘‖ is a generic metric which could represent welfare, equality, liberty, etc or any weighted 
combination of various desirable outcomes. The point T represents the case when the best-case set of 
assumptions holds true. As we move away from this point, the institution is less conducive to 
producing good stuff. The ―Theory‖ metric could measure any variable which affects the performance 
of political institutions, such as the degree of self-interested behaviour.  
For Levy, T represents best case assumptions; benevolent planners, for example. The basic schema, 
though, is just as useful for considering deviations from the most empirically supported assumptions, 
which may or may not be the best case. This would mean that T would not necessarily coincide with 
the peak of graphs A and B, and deviations from T could result in more good stuff being produced, as 
is shown in figure 1.2.  
At the core of robust political economy is the separation of the best descriptive model of how the 
world works from the appropriate model on which to base institutional choice. Brennan and Buchanan 
develop robust political economy as a tool in choosing constitutional rules, but its usefulness extends 
far beyond constitutional choice. To decide when worst-case thinking is appropriate, we need to look 
at the arguments Brennan and Buchanan offer in support of robust political economy. 
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Figure 1.2: The Empirically Best Case 
 
1.3. BRENNAN AND BUCHANAN’S RATIONALE FOR ROBUST POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
Brennan and Buchanan (1999: Ch. 4) attempt to justify the use of the Homo Economicus model of 
human behaviour at the level of constitutional choice, despite its admitted empirical shortcomings. 
While people often act altruistically, they argue, the whole point of constitutional rules is to offer 
protection against those situations in which individual interests diverge and people pursue their own 
interest at the expense of others. If rulers were angels constitutional constraints would be redundant, 
and so any constitution-making exercise must assume that men are knaves.  
Brennan and Buchanan (1999: 59-61) use the example of hiring a contractor to perform some work. In 
doing so, we will normally attempt to ensure that we are dealing with an honest person. When 
drawing up a contract, however, we make the working assumption that he is dishonest and will 
defraud us if given the opportunity. Despite the fact that we do not believe this to be true, we must 
assume so for the sake of contract-making, since dishonest behaviour is exactly what formal 
contracting is meant to guard against. A contract written with an honest tradesman in mind will fail to 
serve its essential purpose and will be just as effective as no contract at all. Empirical reality, on this 
account, should not affect the model of behaviour we choose to use when deciding on rules but rather 
the relevance of the entire rule-making exercise.     
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While Buchanan thinks people often, but not always, act out of self-interest, his theories have value to 
those less convinced of selfish rational-choice as a descriptive model of human behaviour. Even if 
people are often motivated by moral concerns and value the well-being of others, it is dangerous to 
rely on this. Even if an assumption of self-interest is empirically unfounded, it is wise to assume that 
people are selfish when comparing alternative institutions. This insures against the worst possible 
outcomes. By assuming the worst-case view of human nature, or any other politically relevant 
variable, we are putting extra weight on particularly bad outcomes. Taking a worst-case view has 
costs: in the tradesman example, formal contracting has costs, and efforts to live up to the letter of the 
contract may prevent an angelic tradesman from doing the best possible job for his customer.  
1.3.1. Quasi-Risk Aversion 
The justification for engaging in the constitutional enterprise at all comes from the idea of ―quasi-risk 
aversion‖: since the costs of the world being worse than we expect exceed the benefits of it being 
better, we should evaluate institutions on something close to worst-case assumptions. In terms of the 
spectrum between best- and worst-case assumptions, welfare decreases at an increasing rate as we 
move away from the best-case. This implies that a completely risk-neutral decision-maker should 
behave as if they are risk-averse (Brennan & Buchanan 1999: 61-68).  
Brennan and Buchanan (1999: 64-67) offer the example of a monopolist choosing to charge either the 
profit-maximising or socially optimal price. If the simple empirical record shows that such 
monopolists choose each pricing rule half the time, evaluating alternative rules with a simple average 
of the two prices may seem appropriate. This would understate the average welfare costs of such a 
situation, however, since there is a convex relationship between welfare and output. The welfare loss 
associated with the monopolist charging the full profit-maximising price half the time consequently 
exceeds that of the average price being charged all the time. The appropriate assumptions about 
monopolist behaviour will therefore be closer to the worst-case end of the spectrum than a cursory 
glance at the empirical record might suggest. Brennan and Buchanan (1999: 67-68) then argue that the 
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quasi-risk aversion justification for systematically pessimistic assumptions can be generalised to any 
situation, since the good done by angels will be less than the harm done by knaves.  
Brennan and Buchanan do not spend any time establishing the proposition that politics does in fact 
exhibit such ―standard convexity properties.‖ This is an empirical question and surely depends on the 
particular assumptions we make. Since constitutional political economy is primarily concerned with 
the self-interested or altruistic behaviour of political representatives, I will address this question first. 
Robust political economy, however, has been used more broadly than merely considering the public-
spiritedness of political representatives. It will be therefore be useful to consider how broadly the 
convexity assumption remains valid.    
Convexity – in this context, the tendency for the harm of a negative deviation from T to be greater 
than the benefit of an equal positive deviation – seems a reasonable assumption when it comes to 
planner benevolence in contemporary liberal democracies. In relatively well-functioning governments 
with low levels of corruption and oppression, the quantity of additional good stuff an angelic ruler 
could plausibly produce seems tightly limited. A corrupt or vicious government, on the other hand, 
could wreak major havoc. When we consider the already corrupt and vicious governments of history 
and today‘s poorer countries, however, the effect seems to be reversed. When a government is already 
doing its best to exploit its citizens, the extra harm it can do were it even more evil seem minor in 
comparison to the potential benefits of it being even a little less evil. The relationship between planner 
benevolence and good stuff, in other words, seems to asymptote at the extremes of sainthood and 
knavishness, as is illustrated in figure 1.3.  
The convexity properties Brennan and Buchanan use to justify robust political economy are present 
on the right section of the graph but absent on the left. Worst-case political economy is appropriate on 
quasi risk-aversion grounds at point T'' but not at point T'. In fact, since the function is concave at T', 
we should base institutional comparisons upon systematically more optimistic assumptions than the 
empirical record would suggest. Of course, the level of benevolence we suppose will likely be much 
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lower than in more humane polities, since actual benevolence is so much lower towards the left of the 
graph.  
 
Figure 1.3: Non-linear good stuff 
 
This relationship is a simple consequence of diminishing returns to effort directed at achieving some 
goal. Let us suppose, simplifying things slightly, that the goal of completely self-interested planners – 
those at the extreme left of the above graph – is to extract as many resources from the public as 
possible (which, I will suppose, would minimise good stuff), while the goal of very benevolent 
planners is to maximise good stuff. Planners between these two extremes wish to achieve a weighted 
combination, the weighting determined by their position on the graph, of these two goals. Relatively 
benevolent planners, say those at T'', will be able to secure many gains in good stuff for relatively 
little sacrifice of their own interests. Moving slightly to the right of T'', the gains are still relatively 
easy to make. As we move further right, though, increases in good stuff come at proportionally larger 
losses in rent-extraction. Similarly, it becomes increasingly difficult for relatively knavish planners to 
extract rents as they move leftward on the graph. Once all the low-hanging fruit has been picked, it 
becomes difficult for planners to achieve their goals, regardless of the nobility of those goals.  
Things become even more complicated when we consider relevant independent variables other than 
planner benevolence. It may also prove useful to consider the robustness of political institutions to the 
existence of ignorant or irrational voters, incompetent planners, and any number of other factors 
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which affect citizen wellbeing through the political system. Some of these surely exhibit the convexity 
properties required to justify a quasi risk-aversion approach but, just as surely, some do not. Brennan 
and Buchanan offer another argument for taking systematically pessimistic assumptions. This 
argument, however, is not particularly compelling.   
1.3.2. Gresham’s Law  
The second argument offered by Brennan and Buchanan for taking a worst case view of human 
motivation is based on a political analogue Gresham‘s Law: the idea that bad behaviour drives out 
good and that altruism is thus fragile and should not be relied upon (Brennan & Buchanan 1999: 68-
73). This is a theoretical argument for the proposition that people will on average behave more 
knavishly than their underlying preferences might suggest. It is not clear, however, whether this is an 
argument for taking a view of human nature more pessimistic than the simple empirical record 
suggests when evaluating institutions.
1
 This depends on what kind of empirical evidence we rely 
upon. If we could somehow see the real preferences people have over altruistic and self-interested 
behaviour abstracted from how they actually behave, Gresham‘s law of politics would indeed provide 
an argument for the value of robust political economy. If, more plausibly, the empirical record details 
how people actually behave, Gresham‘s law will have already taken effect and be reflected in the 
empirical record. Taking a systematically more pessimistic view would double count the effect. 
1.4. THE APPLICABILITY OF ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY 
In short, we cannot make a blanket assumption that robust political economy is appropriate in all 
institutional analyses. Rather, we need to consider two factors: convexity and likelihood of negative 
deviations. Unless the convexity properties discussed above are present, Brennan and Buchanan‘s 
justification for robust political economy is absent. Of course, being risk-averse in the political sphere 
could be considered prudent, but such an approach would need to be based on a normative argument 
                                                     
1
 It could be the case, however, that self-reinforcing knavery produces an absorbing equilibria from which we 
cannot escape. The welfare losses of being stuck in such a situation may well swamp any short-term concerns 
and thus deserve extra consideration. It is unclear, however, whether constitutional rules designed to lower the 
welfare costs of knavery will be effective in preventing the spread of knavery to others. 
13 
 
about the purpose of political institutions. Robust political economy, then, is only appropriate when 
the harm caused by negative deviations from ideal or empirically-likely conditions exceeds the benefit 
caused by positive deviations. Secondly, the extent to which we should make systematically 
pessimistic assumptions depends on the probability that such unfavourable conditions will eventuate. 
If we can be reasonably confident that rulers will remain benevolent, our assumptions should only be 
mildly pessimistic, even in the presence of convexity.  
1.5. THESIS PLAN 
The aim of this thesis will be to reveal both the strengths and limitations of the robust political 
economy approach to institutional comparison. This will combine public choice analysis with 
empirical testing of the central hypotheses of robust political economy and discursive analysis of the 
appropriate approach to take when comparing constitutions.  
Chapter two will evaluate Brennan and Buchanan‘s assertion that constitutions are capable of 
protecting freedom when it would otherwise be abrogated. Many theorists have questioned the 
bindingness of constitutions, some suggesting that mere parchment enforced by the very organisation 
it is meant to constrain can do nothing to protect freedom. This chapter will largely be concerned with 
substantive constitutional constraints as embodied in bills of rights, as opposed to structural features 
such as a separation of power specified in the constitution.  
While constitutional political economy deals with both types of constitutional provision, substantive 
constraints are essential to Brennan and Buchanan‘s normative project of protecting certain liberties 
by placing them firmly in the private sphere. Structural constraints may be capable of mitigating the 
tyranny of the majority, but in no sense can they keep certain cherished values out of politics 
altogether. Only substantive rules protecting religious practice or speech, for example, are potentially 
capable of doing this and their effectiveness is far from clear.    
After considering theoretical arguments for and against the effect of substantive constitutional rules 
and offering hypotheses on when such rules will be effective, I will conduct an empirical test using 
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the case of press freedom as an example. The results of this analysis provide insights into the 
effectiveness of constitutions, including the conditions in which they are effective, and points to both 
strengths and weaknesses in the conception of constitutions as protecting against the worst-case 
scenarios of governance.  
Chapter three will focus more closely on a particular deviation from the ideal state of the world: a 
sudden spike in illiberal preferences. After arguing that such spikes are common and should be given 
consideration in institutional analysis, I will argue that structural constitutional constraints which 
increase the size of the coalition required for policy change can reduce the probability that such 
preference spikes will come to be reflected in policy but can also increase the duration of illiberal 
policy. While this is a difficult hypothesis to test empirically, I will argue that structural constraints 
delayed both the enactment and repeal of alcohol prohibition in the early twentieth century and 
increased its total duration.   
This shows that alternative institutions will often involve tradeoffs even when we restrict our 
normative attention to something as precise as negative freedom. Whether the negative libertarian 
should prefer a relatively constrained or unconstrained democracy depends on a number of factors 
which are not clearly commensurable. This suggests that institutional evaluation is normatively 
complex, and that political economists therefore need to be sensitive to moral arguments.  
Chapter four expands upon this theme of the essentially moral character of institutional analysis by 
providing a critique of the foundations of welfare economics. Whereas many Austrian economists and 
others have criticised the epistemic arrogance of welfare economists and counselled against the 
careless attribution of individual utility functions and the social aggregation thereof, I will make the 
stronger argument that welfare economics as it is currently practised is simply impossible, regardless 
of epistemic concerns.  
A number of findings in psychology and behavioural economics suggest that choices do not simply 
reveal pre-existing preferences but construct them. The finding that contextual factors deemed 
irrelevant by rational choice theory influence human decision-making is simply not consistent with a 
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well-defined preference function existing independently of choice and requires the abandonment or 
radical reworking of rational choice theory. Many behavioural economists have argued that this shows 
people are irrational. I will suggest instead that rationality should not be thought of as an optimisation 
process but a constructive process in which embodied humans pursue their several and 
incommensurable goals using a variety of contextual cues.  
The upshot of this for normative economics is that it the attribution of abstract preferences or interests 
to individuals simply makes no sense. People have a variety of desires prior to choice but only have 
preferences, in the sense of an ordinal ranking of alternatives, at a particular time, place, and context 
of choice. This means that externalities, for example, have no determinate size and may be of 
indeterminate sign. The example of cost-benefit analysis is used to show that this requires a non-
algorithmic comparative institutional analysis in which the conclusions of positive social science are 
imported as premises in moral arguments.  
Chapter five concludes by drawing these lessons together and arguing for a non-algorithmic approach 
to institutional analysis which considers multiple dependent and independent variables, multiple 
assumptions about the state of the world, and multiple metrics of desirability. Such an approach is 
extremely unlikely to inform policy in large-scale democracies, however, and I will argue that 
decentralizing political power to the community level will better facilitate the deliberative processes 
required to produce reasonable policy.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Chapter Two 
Does Parchment Matter? Constitutions and Freedom 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Government ostensibly exists to prevent private predation of the weak by the strong and the few by 
the many. In many cases, though, government becomes the instrument of predation by either political 
elites or majorities. Using evil (institutionalised violence) to do good (prevent private violence) is 
necessarily a Faustian bargain (Ostrom 1984). Constitutionalism is essentially an attempt to mitigate 
the danger of this bargain by limiting the scope for government to act as a tool of predation. The 
extent to which constitutional controls can constrain government, though, is far from clear. Some 
constitutionalists seem to take government respect for constitutional rules as axiomatic; some non-
constitutionalists see government power as fundamentally unbounded. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the degree to which constitutions can limit the power of 
government. Are constitutions mere parchment barriers which can be broken at the whim of those 
with political power, or do they act as genuine constraint? If the latter, what is the mechanism of this 
constraint, and under what conditions will constitutions prove effective? 
My point of departure in answering these questions will be the work of scholars within the public 
choice school of political economy. The sub-discipline of constitutional political economy has 
provided the most rigorous defence of the desirability of constitutional limits on the power of 
government. The foundational work is James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock‘s (1962) The 
Calculus of Consent, which formally models democratic decision-making and shows that self-interest 
in unbridled majoritarian government will lead to exploitation of minorities by majorities. Since each 
person can expect to be in the minority on some issues, self-interest will compel people to prefer 
limitations on the power of government – to promise not to use the force of government to exploit 
others, in exchange for a similar promise from everyone else.    
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This line of argument has been followed by other political economists, notably Buchanan and his 
frequent co-author Geoffrey Brennan. The central theme of this new field of constitutional political 
economy has been the rationality of individuals instituting governments among themselves but also 
limiting the power of those governments through substantive and procedural constitutional rules. Like 
Ulysses binding himself to the mast, citizens will rationally choose to limit their own future power, 
knowing that they cannot be trusted to act in ways which serve their own interests. Constitutional 
constraints provide the ―rules of the game‖ within which government operates. By fostering 
agreement on what political behaviour is legitimate, constitutions reduce the danger of faction and 
tyranny in the political sphere and mitigate the social dilemma which threatens to destroy peace and 
order.  
Constitutional political economy views government through a contractarian lens: governments are 
instituted among men in order to serve their interests. While the social contract in undoubtedly 
fictional in historical terms, the contractarian approach may justify political arrangements by showing 
them to be in the interest of individuals. Contractualist theory, then, is normative rather than 
descriptive: the goal of institutional analysis is to show what agreements people would make in a 
hypothetical constitutional convention, rather then what agreements they have in fact made. While 
constractarian theory is not without its problems, for the purposes of this chapter I will take this 
approach.  
2.2. THE LOGIC OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 
2.2.1. The Escape from Hobbesian Anarchy 
The standard assumption in political economy is that the state of nature is characterised by chaos.
2
 
Each individual in the state of nature would prefer to live in world where everyone respects each 
other‘s basic liberties and chooses to engage in production rather than predation, but collective action 
problems prevent this happy state of affairs from coming about. Each individual has an incentive to 
                                                     
2
 While there is a large literature (see Powell & Stringham 2009 for an overview) arguing that orderly anarchy is 
possible and preferable to the situation in which one institution is granted a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force, I will take the standard assumption of Hobbesian anarchy as given for the purpose of this chapter.  
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take from others rather than produce themselves. While everyone would gladly give up their ability to 
plunder in exchange for the equal relinquishment of others, such an agreement would be 
unenforceable without an external authority to arbitrate and enforce. This social dilemma (Tullock 
1974) condemns those in the state of nature to a war of all against all. For Hobbes, people escape the 
state of nature by ceding their liberties to a powerful sovereign. This Leviathan is unlikely to respect 
rights but will produce social order and allow people to move from predation to production, even if a 
good deal of their product is plundered by Leviathan.  
2.2.2. The Social Dilemma of Unrestrained Government 
Of course, government is not some unitary social actor but is itself a spontaneous order emergent from 
the interaction of various political actors constrained by their environment and each other (Wagner 
1988, 1993a, 1993b). While some totalitarian governments approximate the Leviathan model of a 
small elite preying on the population at large, most predation in industrial democracies involves a 
large alliance of citizens using the machinery of the state to pursue its interests at the expense of some 
other group.  
Government can facilitate predation in number of ways. Concentrated and well-organised interest 
groups can seek favours from policymakers which harm society at large (Tullock 1967; Olson 1971; 
Krueger 1974); majorities can extract resources from minorities (Buchanan & Tullock 1962) or force 
them to behave in accordance with their version of morality (Gusfield 1963; Edelman 1964, 1971). 
James Madison was much more concerned with the danger of predation through factions using the 
machinery of the state than with a single tyrant taking control of government. In a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson, he states quite clearly that ―the invasion of private rights is cheifly to be apprehended, not 
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the 
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents‖ (Madison 1788).   
Rather than one actor dominating others – creating order at the expense of justice – government is 
characterised by competing factions using political means as a substitute for private violence. As 
Madison points out in Federalist 51, a government in which ―the stronger faction can readily unite 
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and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature.‖ While 
unrestrained government may remove much of the physical violence of the war of all against all, it 
does not remove the underlying predation and conflict. Participants in the government social dilemma 
remain trapped in a collective action problem: each would be better off if they could somehow agree 
to respect each others‘ rights, but each has an incentive to renege on any such agreement when part of 
the ruling coalition (Gwartney &Wagner 1988: 18).
3
  
Like Hobbesian anarchy, this leads to unproductive expenditure in predation and protection against 
the predation of others. Tullock (1967) shows, for example, that costly, zero-sum rent-seeking 
dissipates some of the profits accruing to winners of the competition for state-enforced monopolies. 
While the potential plunder available to a firm which can convince the state to grant it special favours 
is large, the socially unproductive courtship efforts by multiple firms removes some of the ex ante 
benefits potential predators receive. When all is said and done, the costs of corporatism to the public 
at large are not fully offset by benefits to well-connected firms. Even those frequently in bed with 
government would sometimes prefer a government which denied them these opportunities.
4
  
Absent a stable and homogenous group which can expect to retain power, everyone would prefer a 
binding agreement not to violate the rights of others and we remain in an n-person prisoner‘s 
dilemma. The only difference between Hobbesian anarchy and Hobbesian government is that rent-
seeking replaces the direct use of force: lawyers and lobbyists replace guns (Wagner & Gwartney 
1988: 36).  
2.2.3. Constitution as Escape from the Hobbesian State  
At the heart of constitutionalism is the notion that the state is not above the law. The government is 
not the source of law or the rights of citizens but is subordinate to the social contract by which it is 
established (McIlwain 1947). This idea was in the mind of the authors of the US Declaration of 
                                                     
3
 Alfred Cuzán (1979) makes a similar but distinct point when arguing that we can never really get out of 
anarchy. He sees the state as subjecting relations among citizens to the control of a third party, but relations 
within government remain anarchic (i.e. bilateral, without external control). 
4
 Though the empirical evidence suggests that the degree of rent dissipation is surprisingly small. See Section 1 
of Tullock (1989).   
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Independence, who found it self-evident that ―Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.‖ The role of 
government, according to constitutional political economists, is to act as an external arbitrator 
enforcing the rights delimited in the social compact but having nothing to say on the merit of those 
rights. Just as a jury is meant to decide matters of fact and remain silent on the justice of the laws in 
question, so government should mechanically protect already-defined rights and liberties.  The liberal 
constitutional state is purely procedural (Buchanan 1975: Ch. 6).  
Government, of course, does not naturally stand outside of society as a neutral third party. At the core 
of constitutional political economy is the idea that unbridled government power is apt to produce 
tyranny. This can be a tyranny of either the majority (Buchanan & Tullock 1962: Ch. 8.) or political 
elites (Brennan & Buchanan 2000). To realise the ideal of state as referee, constitutional limits are 
required. This leads to the distinction between the constitutional and post-constitutional stages of 
collective choice.  
When making any collective choice, conflicting interests will lead to disagreement. As every 
particular political decision benefits some at the expense of others, post-constitutional politics is 
inherently adversarial. To mitigate this conflict, the rules of politics must be decided separately from 
everyday politics. Just as unanimity over the rules of a card game is more likely before the cards are 
dealt, so constitutional choice must take place at a higher level of abstraction than pragmatic politics. 
This is similar to Rawls‘s (1971) suggestion that justice can be decided by people ignorant of their 
particular interests and preferences. Buchanan‘s veil is much thinner than Rawls‘s: individuals retain 
a normal level of knowledge about their station in life, but the abstractness and generality of 
constitutional rules provides the uncertainty required to prevent self-serving choice.  
Where Rawls imagines a hypothetical veil of ignorance, Buchanan posits an actual veil of uncertainty. 
Constitutional rules are high-level meta-rules for deciding how lower-level concrete rules are made. 
There will be innumerable rules made within a set of constitutional meta-rules. As such, individuals 
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will not generally be aware of which constitutional rules are likely to give them an unfair advantage 
over others. This will lead people to promote the general good (Buchanan &Tullock 1962: 78-79):   
Essential to the analysis is the presumption that the individual is uncertain as to 
what his own precise role will be in any one of the whole chain of later collective 
choices that will actually have to be made. For this reason he is considered not to 
have a particular and distinguishable interest separate and apart from his fellows. 
… His own self-interest will lead him to choose rules that will maximize the utility 
of an individual in a series of collective decisions with his own preferences on the 
separate issues being more or less randomly distributed. (Buchanan & Tullock 
1962: 74.) 
Impartial self-interest will compel individuals behind the veil of uncertainty to favour tight restrictions 
on the power of majoritarian democracy. While an individual can expect to be among the plundering 
majority at some times, he will be among the plundered minority at others. All things considered, he 
will prefer a welfare-maximising constitution. This will protect the minority from the tyranny of the 
majority and produce something resembling the classical liberal ideal of a minimal state. Since post-
constitutional politics lacks invisible hand mechanisms aligning individual and collective interests, 
unconstrained behaviour at this level will lead to suboptimal results. At the constitutional level, on the 
other hand, the veil of uncertainty does align incentives and will tend to produce optimal rules.  
2.2.4. Worst-Case Political Economy 
The constitutional project is premised on the notion that politicians and other political actors cannot 
be trusted to promote the general interest. James Madison took this position in Federalist 51:  
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no 
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind 
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.  
Indeed, Brennan and Buchanan‘s version of robust political economy, described in the first chapter, 
was formulated specifically as a way of defending their constitutional vision against charges of 
behavioural unrealism. Constitutional constraints, they argue, are desirable insofar as they protect 
against the worst excesses of government. Even if we have no reason to think that politicians will use 
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the power of the state to pursue their selfish ends or that the majority will oppress minorities, it is 
prudent to choose constitutional rules on the basis that this is the case. Protecting against tyranny is, 
after all, the entire point of the constitutional exercise.   
2.2.5. Structural versus Substantive Constitutionalism  
Buchanan admits that his argument depends on the ability of constitutions to constrain the power of 
government (Buchanan 2001: 47-49). To consider whether this is so, it is necessary to consider 
different types of constitutional rules separately. The most relevant distinction is between structural 
and substantive constraints. The former seek to distribute political power in such a way as to limit the 
power of faction; such as federalism, the separation of powers, bicameral legislatures, and electoral 
procedures. Madison was clearly interested in structural constitutionalism when, in Federalist 51, he 
argued that ―[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.‖5 Substantive constitutionalism, on the 
other hand, seeks to limit the legitimate actions of government by formal decree, explicitly defining a 
public and private sphere and protecting the latter from interference. The American Bill of Rights is 
the most celebrated example of substantive constitutionalism. The fact that Madison and many other 
framers were ambivalent toward the prospect of the Bill of Rights, which was added as afterthought 
due to pressure from others, demonstrates their commitment to structural constitutionalism.  
Structural constraints are generally self-enforcing. Rather than limiting the power of government per 
se, they create a different kind of government less apt to violate individual rights. Structural rules, of 
course, are enacted in constitutions by mere words: ultimately, everything is parchment. Could not 
members of the White House, Senate, House of Representatives, and various state governments 
simply decide that they no longer wished to be restrained by the separation of powers and form a 
totalitarian regime? If it is power that ultimately matters, could not the executive branch, with its 
control of the military, simply ignore the decisions of the court? In the colourful but misquoted 
(Boller and George 1990: 53) words of Andrew Jackson: ―John Marshall has made his decision; now 
let him enforce it!‖ Both of these scenarios are possible but unlikely. Most obviously, government 
                                                     
5
 Madison was presumably influenced by Montesquieu (1989) and Hume (1875).  
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must guard against being thrown out at the next election or, in more extreme circumstances, at the 
barrel of a gun. So long as the public views the distribution of formal powers as laid out in the 
constitution as legitimate and are willing to punish rulers for breaking the rules, formal power will be 
translated into practical power. While even structural rules can sometimes fail – one branch of 
government can capture, or simply ignore, another – it seems reasonable to treat them as self-
enforcing and binding in most cases.  
The effect of substantive constraints is less theoretically obvious. Substantive constraints also seem 
more important to constitutional political economy. If constitutional rules are to delimit the scope of 
legitimate post-constitutional actions, they will need to be more than purely structural. Structural rules 
alter the balance of political powers but are not capable of setting any firm limits on political action. 
They can never guarantee the maintenance of a private sphere: a sufficiently large majority in favour 
of abrogating property rights or freedom of religion, for example, will always be successful unless 
there is some way to sequester these freedoms away from the influence of collective choice. Only 
substantive constraints have the potential to do this. For these reasons, the following sections will 
focus primarily on substantive constraints when it asks whether the assumption of constitutional 
enforceability is reasonable. 
2.3.  BEST-CASE THINKING THROUGH THE BACK DOOR 
Brennan and Buchanan‘s argument for taking a pessimistic view of human nature at the post-
constitutional state is convincing. It is not clear, however, to what extent constitutions can actually 
restrain government. Even if the veil of uncertainty successfully aligns individual interest and welfare 
maximisation at the constitutional stage and produces optimal rules,
6
 the problem of enforcement 
remains. Constitutional rules are ultimately only parchment barriers and must be enforced if they are 
to be binding.  
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 There is reason to doubt that this will be so. Parham (2010) points out that constitution-making is vulnerable to 
manipulation by dominant factions and well-connected interest groups in the same way as post-constitutional 
politics. Further, if expressive preferences dominate at the level of constitutional choice, as Brennan and Hamlin 
(2002) argue, the veil of uncertainty will not produce optimal rules. Crampton and Farrant (2004) further argue 
that a constitutional convention will fall prey to either despotism, if instrumental concerns dominate, or 
irrational policy, if expressive concerns dominate.  
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Farrant (2004) and Farrant and Paganelli (2005) argue that while Buchanan‘s constitutionalism 
professes to engage in worst-case theorising, it allows best-case thinking in through the back door by 
assuming constitutions are always respected and enforced. In fact, constitutional constraints are only 
―contingently robust.‖ The effectiveness of a political institution depends on its enforcement: 
Buchanan argues for constitutional constraints to check the knavery of public 
choosers, thus implicitly abandoning the assumption of motivational symmetry at 
the constitutional level [and] supposing angels both write and enforce the 
constitutional rules of the game. (Farrant & Paganelli 2005: 74) 
Does constitutional political economy have something akin to a benevolent-despot 
assumption … at its very heart? Without such an assumption, however, it is unclear 
why – in terms of Levy‘s ‗insurance‘ metaphor – the ‗insurance‘ will actually pay 
off when ―worst-case‖ disaster threatens to rear its ugly head. (Farrant 2004: 449)    
 
While Buchanan and other constitutional political economists vigilantly engage in worst-case 
theorising at the level of everyday politics, they are naïve best-case thinkers at the constitutional level. 
Something must enforce constitutional rules. Whether this is the government proper or some quasi-
independent agency, it is unreasonable to assume its benevolence. Farrant admits that best-case 
theorising can be useful in some situations but insists that ―political economists ought to readily admit 
to themselves that best-case thinking is perhaps inescapable within their models‖ (Farrant & Paganelli 
2005: 82).  
Brennan and Buchanan, though, do not suggest that worst-case thinking is the only appropriate view 
to take when conducting normative political economy. The argument for robust political economy 
rests on the harm caused by undesirable deviations from the best empirical assumptions relative to the 
benefit caused by desirable deviations, combined with the empirical likelihood of negative deviations. 
For worst-case thinking to be appropriate at the constitutional level of analysis, then, two conditions 
must be met: the harm of negative deviations from assumptions must exceed the benefit of positive 
deviations, and the constitution must be relatively unenforceable.   
The first condition seems to be met: Brennan and Buchanan‘s quasi-risk aversion argument seems at 
least as pertinent for constitutional enforceability as for the benevolence of rulers in everyday politics. 
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If substantive limits on government power are generally aimed at protecting the most important 
liberties, their circumvention is likely to be extremely harmful.  The pertinence of Farrant and 
Paganelli‘s accusations of best-case thinking, then, ultimately reduce to a factual question amenable to 
positive theoretical and empirical analysis: are constitutions effective in protecting against tyranny? 
The remainder of this chapter will be an attempt to answer this question. Since the best-case thinking 
critique seems much more relevant to substantive constitutional rules, this is where I will focus my 
analysis.  
2.4. THE EFFECT OF CONSTITUTIONS  
2.4.1. Mere Parchment? 
Substantive constitutional rules are themselves only marks on paper. Unless they are enforced or 
internalised by political actors, they will have no effect. James Madison clearly recognised this. In his 
letter to Thomas Jefferson, Madison (1788) expressed a reserved endorsement of a bill of rights but 
insisted that the exclusion in the original constitution was not a ―material defect‖ and felt no pressing 
need, save the opinions of others, to enumerate basic rights via amendment. Madison saw enumerated 
rights as important mainly in monarchies or other forms of government where political and physical 
force is separated. Were a king to violate the bill of rights, parchment may provide a focal point upon 
which the majority of the community – who maintain the physical power under any system of 
government - may organise revolt. In a democracy such as the United Sates, however, the threat of 
tyranny comes largely from the majority itself: political and physical power is vested in the same 
faction. Madison suggests that parchment barriers are completely incapable of preventing abuses of 
power whenever such abuse is demanded by the public.  
Thinkers such as Gordon Tullock (1987) and Anthony de Jasay (1989) have pointed out that if 
substantive constraints on government power are to be considered binding rules, they must be 
enforced. This enforcement could come from government itself, or some agency meant to stand 
outside and above government. In either case, we are left with an enforcement agency which is itself 
unconstrained. It is all very well to insist that government is not above the law, but when government 
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interprets and enforces the constitution, it is difficult to see how law could prevail when the political 
wishes of government and the legal stipulations of the constitution conflict.  
Channelling Madison, de Jasay argues that if the dominant forces of society, as represented by 
government, desired some outcome unattainable under the existing constitution, there is nothing 
preventing them from simply using another constitutional rule and having their way. Without 
someone to guard the guardians, government power is unbounded.  Constraints on government which 
are themselves part of the government machinery are nonsensical. Government is only limited by 
constitutional rules if it accepts and abides by them, and a rule which is only binding when one 
decides to obey it is no rule at all. Anything more substantial would require a rule ―that is 
representative yet stands above interests, decisive yet benign, conflictual yet unanimous, square yet 
round‖ (de Jasay 1989: 299).    
Tullock insists that any durable effective constitution must be self-enforcing. He sees little prospect of 
a self-enforcing bill of rights and says that the problem of created self-enforcing (in the long run) 
structural constitution has ―so far evaded solution‖ (Tullock 1987: 318).7 The central problem of 
constitutionalism is that constitutions can be ignored, interpreted in ways to circumvent restrictions, or 
amended. Without an arbiter external to society and above interest, the social compact enshrined in 
the constitution can never be a truly enforceable agreement.   
2.4.2.  How Are Constitutions Undermined? 
Bargains struck at the constitutional stage can later be violated in a number of ways. In the most 
extreme case, the constitution can simply be ignored or discarded. If the preferences of legislators 
conflict with the constitution and neither the public nor other branches of government are willing and 
able to punish violation, the chances of constraint seem slim. Another possible avenue for large 
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 Laffont (2000) uses contract theory to formulate mechanisms designed to limit the principal-agent problems 
between the voting public and government. While this line of thinking may offer ways of ameliorating the 
problems of rent-seeking and other forms of bureaucratic slack, it does not address the central problem of this 
chapter: factions of the voting public using the machinery of the state to repress each other.    
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majorities determined to perform acts forbidden by the constitution is amendment. Many 
constitutions, of course, erect significant barriers – such as referenda, supermajorities and successive 
majorities – to constitutional amendment. While these barriers can be overcome when a sufficient 
number of people demand amendment, entrenched constitutions seem fairly resistant to change.
 8
  
Even if a constitution remains intact and commands the professed allegiance of political actors, 
however, constitutional agreements can be undermined through interpretation and manipulation. Since 
laws, like contracts, never provide unambiguous guidance for action, the effective constitution can 
change over time. Voigt (1999) suggests that constitutions are subject to ―implicit change.‖ The 
effective constitution emerges from the strategic interaction of different branches of government, 
interest groups, and the public; each of whom has different preferences over policy. Ackerman (1991) 
argues that there have twice – in the 1860s and 1930s respectively – been significant changes to the 
effective constitution of the United States without alteration of the text.  
Robert Higgs (1988) similarly argues against a simple view of the constitution as existing merely as 
words on paper. There are, he argues, three loci of the constitution. The de facto constitution arises 
out of constitutional document itself, what the court says it is, and what the public thinks it is (Higgs 
1988: 374-376). The third locus depends on the dominant ideology within society. Since this changes 
during times of emergency, it makes sense to think of a distinct ―crisis constitution,‖ which comes 
into effect even as the written document remains unchanged. In times of perceived crisis, the voting 
public will often demand restrictions on liberty in the name of safety. Politicians, being agents of 
voters subject to electoral discipline, will respond to this demand. Courts may declare policies 
unconstitutional, but there are strong incentives against judicial activism in times of crisis, with courts 
not bending to popular preferences facing the possibility of being ignored and having their legitimacy 
undermined. The judicial branch will therefore be reluctant to stand up to legislature in times of 
emergency. This, says Higgs, is exactly what we see in the historical record (Higgs 1988,: 378-379).  
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 For positive analyses of constitutional amendment, see Boudreaux and Pritchard (1993) and Lutz (1994).  
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If Higgs is correct, the constitution loses its binding force precisely at those times it is most needed. 
History shows us that crises of various sorts tend to lead to the expansion of government and the 
abrogation of liberty (Higgs 1987). This hypothesis is obviously at odds with Brennan and 
Buchanan‘s insurance metaphor of the constitution, and the empirical analysis later in this chapter will 
attempt to shed light on this dispute.     
2.4.3. Parchment Reduces Probability of Tyranny  
Experience tells us unequivocally that constitutional constraints can be circumvented: governments 
have often broken their own rules. Effective constraints, however, need not be absolute. It is possible 
that constitutions protect against the worst outcomes not by being the last line of defence against 
tyrannical interest and power but by making interest and power less tyrannical. If we wish to compare 
the ability of bound and unbound government to avoid disaster, it is not simply the badness of the 
worst outcome which is relevant but also the probability of that outcome. Levy‘s analogy with robust 
statistics suggests that the probability of a given state of the world is independent of political 
institutions. This is clearly not the case. This can be shown by modifying Levy‘s diagrammatic 
representation of robustness. Taking an extreme case to illustrate the point, Figure 2.1 shows 
institution B as completely dominated by A when using Levy‘s logic.    
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Figure 2.1: A Dominated Institution 
 
If the horizontal axis is used to represent a state of the world weighted by how likely it is under a 
given political institution, however, a very different result could be observed. Now the further we are 
from T, the less likely that state of the world is to hold. Suppose that the state of the world was much 
more likely to remain close to ideal conditions under institution B. This would vertically flatten and 
horizontally stretch B relative to A. With enough of a difference in probability, something like Figure 
2.2 could result. Now institution B seems more robust than institution A. Taking probability into 
account is surely a better measure of robustness than simple unweighted states of the world.  
Figure 2.2: Dominated No More 
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In the very worst case, institutional variables do not matter at all. As Aristotle (Politics, Book 7, Part 
IX) puts it, ―those who carry arms can always determine the fate of the constitution.‖ Absolute knaves 
will ignore rules completely and rules will be irrelevant. On the minimax criterion, there is no basis 
for choosing between any two sets of institutions. The minimax criterion is, of course, a foolish choice 
rule. It is reasonable to give extra weight to particularly bad outcomes. It is not reasonable to 
completely ignore everything but the worst outcome. There are a number of possible mechanisms 
through which mere parchment could reduce the pressure for tyranny. Madison (1788), generally 
sceptical of parchment barriers, points to two ways in which they might protect against oppression.  
First, Madison saw the constitution as having an important role in shaping public opinion, in addition 
to that of creating a structural separation of powers (Sheehan 1992, 2005). In his letter to Jefferson, he 
made this quite clear: ―The political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the 
character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the 
national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion.‖ If the public sees the constitution 
as possessing legitimate authority, its substantive provisions may influence voter preferences and 
therefore policy outcomes. The most obvious example of this is the second amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. The constitutionally protected right to keep and bear arms has provided a powerful 
political argument to those opposed to gun control. 
The analysis thus far has proceeded as if policymakers act as perfect agents of the majority. While this 
is not entirely true, the normative problems of unrestrained government exist even without corrupt 
politicians, and policy does seem to follow public opinion fairly closely (Page & Shapiro 1983; 
Althaus 2003; Caplan & Stringham 2005; Crampton 2002). The principal-agent relationship between 
citizens and the state, however, is never absolute. The problem of observability of contractual 
violation (Hölmstrom 1979), exacerbated in the political arena by rational ignorance (Downs 1957), 
gives politicians and bureaucrats some slack to pursue their own goals against the preferences of the 
voting majority.   
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Introducing principal-agent problems brings us to Madison‘s second reason to favour a bill of rights: 
to protect against tyrannical government not backed by the majority faction. While Madison saw the 
greatest risk of tyranny in majority and faction, he recognised the possibility of political elites 
tyrannising the population at large. Substantive rules could provide a focal point (―good ground for an 
appeal to the sense of the community‖) around which citizens could focus their resistance. A 
substantive prohibition would provide a clear test of whether rulers are breaking the rules and thus 
make punishment by the public – with either ballots or bullets – more likely.9  
Even if government does not become overly tyrannical, substantive constitutional rules could provide 
a clear code of conduct meant to prevent particularly harmful forms of agent slack. In the U.S. 
constitution, the Fifth Amendment‘s prohibition of takings without just compensation, as well as the 
general welfare clause of Article 1, Section 8, can be seen as rules aimed at making self-interested 
politicians more accountable.  
If we accept that most tyranny in functional democracies is actively demanded by the public, the 
degree to which parchment protects freedom by mitigating the principal-agent problem will be limited 
in those countries. Where principal-agent problems are more serious, we might expect parchment to 
be more effective. Of course, the slack in the relationship may also enable rulers in corrupt regimes to 
better hide their misdeeds. This will be true of unpopular policies whether or not they are prohibited 
by the constitution, however, and so parchment should have greater marginal effect in countries with 
high corruption. Though Brennan and Buchanan do not have this mechanism in mind, it is consistent 
with their view of constitutions as protecting against the very worst outcomes. Like insurance, 
parchment barriers become effective only when conditions are bad.  
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 Weingast (2005) models a constitution as a coordination device used by citizens to organise resistance to 
tyrannical government. 
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2.4.4. Parchment Backed by Structure 
Another relevant consideration is the interaction of structural and substantive rules. The most obvious 
example of this is judicial review. We can think about the constitutional effect of judicial review in 
two ways: as a purely structural constraint on majoritarian democracy, or as an enforcement agency 
for substantive constitutional clauses. That is, as an institution primarily either political or legal in 
nature.  
By creating another veto point, judicial review creates a structural constraint on policy-making. In this 
sense, judicial review is primarily a political, rather than legal, institution (Dahl 1957). In the United 
States and most other countries, the judges of the supreme or constitutional court are indirectly elected 
through democratic decision-making. If an elected official appoints judges for life (or any term 
exceeding that of the elected official himself), we can think of the Court as another democratic 
institution in which representatives are chosen through a mechanism different to that of the other 
policymaking institutions of the legislature and executive. A judiciary with the power to strike down 
legislation it deems unconstitutional, like a bicameral legislature, adds another veto point and thereby 
increases the size of the minimum winning coalition. This potentially protects minority interests but 
does so without reference to the substantive clauses of the constitution. Along these lines, Landes and 
Posner (1975) argue that an independent judiciary with life tenure allows interest-group deals struck 
through legislatures to survive after the legislature has been replaced. The Supreme Court, then, is an 
agent of current as well as past legislatures. This has the potential to protect the interests of those 
formerly within the ruling coalition but now outside it; thus providing a check on majoritarian power.  
Of course, the court is only granted power to strike down laws inconsistent with the constitution and 
so the veto point is, at least in formal terms, much weaker than that provided by a president or second 
house of legislature. This leads to the second way to think about judicial review: as a legal institution 
designed to enforce the substantive clauses of the constitution. In the popular imagination at least, an 
independent judiciary is capable of acting as an impartial enforcer of constitutional rules. This does 
not necessarily cause the problems of guarding the guardians of the guardians, since power is not 
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necessarily hierarchical. Contra de Jasay, the extra-governmental agency designed to bind government 
is not itself unbounded, since the two parties could potentially have the power to guard each other 
(Hume 1875).   
The problem with this view is the indeterminacy of substantive constitutional provisions. Law must be 
interpreted and will normally permit a variety of readings which can be chosen to suit the Court‘s 
ideological or material preferences. If parchment were enough to ensure that the Court will respect 
certain rights, it is unclear why the legislature cannot be similarly constrained, thus obviating the need 
for judicial review. Being sworn to protect the constitution may place some limits on the 
policymaking power of the court, but the possibility of liberal interpretation precludes a purely legal 
institution which stands above the political interests and faction against which it was created to 
protect. 
Buchanan (1974, 1988) seems to see judicial review entirely in the second sense, as a legal institution 
acting as an impartial third party. The court in its role as umpire takes a dispassionate ―truth-
judgement‖ approach to the question. It does not represent interests or attempt to make compromises 
between competing factions but makes an almost mechanical judgement as to whether a piece of 
legislation violates the constitution. Even if the judiciary has the intent to act as a dispassionate 
guardian of substantive constitutional protections, however, it may lack the ability. Madison warned 
in Federalist 48 of the potential for the legislative branch to dominate the other two. The legislature 
may be able to ignore the decisions of the Court. This seems especially likely in times of crisis and 
when a majority of the population are against strict enforcement of the constitution. If this is the case, 
the court may simply go along with the legislature for fear of losing legitimacy (Higgs 1988: 378-
379). The judicial branch may then become an agent of the legislature, increasing its power by 
providing legitimacy through an ostensible, but ineffective, separation of powers.   
There are theoretical arguments running in many directions and there seems to be little basis for 
reaching conclusions on whether judicial review is an effective political or legal check on the power 
of government. We will need to turn to the data in order to answer these questions. If judicial review 
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influences policy regardless of substantive constitutional rules, we can be confident that it mainly 
operates as a purely structural constraint on government: a political institution. If, on the other hand, 
parchment and judicial review are both required to protect individual liberties, we have evidence that 
judicial review is a legal institution enforcing the constitution. A third possibility is that judicial 
review has no effect at all.  
2.5.  EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS 
In order to investigate empirically whether constitutional rules constrain policy choice and thereby 
have an effect on freedom, we need to find a constitutional rule which is neither too common nor 
uncommon and for which there exists a reliable measure of the outcome. Most constitutional rules, 
though, are either very common or very uncommon. Freedom of expression, assembly, and 
association, for example, are guaranteed in most constitutions containing a bill of rights. The right to 
bear arms, on the other hand, is very uncommon. Without a significant number of cases taking each 
value in our variable of interest, the explanatory power of the model is reduced.
10
 Additionally, we 
might run into problems measuring the policy outcomes we are interested in. Governments can restrict 
freedom in any number of ways, and any attempt to estimate the total level of freedom in a particular 
domain is bound to be a major undertaking. Fortunately, indices of freedom in various domains 
already exist. This does, though, restrict the types of constitutional provision we can choose to 
investigate.  
Two types of freedom which meet these two conditions fairly well are economic freedom and 
freedom of the press. The right to conduct a business, for example, is guaranteed by around 35 percent 
of the constitutions studied by the Comparative Constitutions Project, and economic freedom is 
measured annually by both the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation.
11
 Around 60 percent of 
constitutions guarantee press freedom, and around 35 percent prohibit censorship. Further, Reporters 
without Borders and Freedom House both produce indices of press freedom.
12
 Since guarantees of 
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 Reports on various constitutional rights are available at http://www.constitutionmaking.org/reports.html 
11
 See http://www.freetheworld.com/ and http://www.heritage.org/Index/ 
12
 See http://www.rsf.org/ and http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16 
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property rights and the freedom to do business are particularly common in post-soviet states, I will 
investigate the effect of constitutional guarantees of press freedom and prohibition of censorship on 
freedom of the press as it is experienced by journalists. 
2.5.1.  Structural Rules  
The theoretical predictions made by public choice theorists regarding the effect of structural rules 
such as electoral system and separation of powers on policy choice and the level of freedom enjoyed 
by citizens are fairly straightforward.
13
  The central prediction of relevance here is that systems of 
government with more effective veto points will require a larger coalition to enact policy and will 
therefore act as a brake on the tyranny of the majority. More veto points, however, will also lead to 
higher government spending as broader sections of the population require placation through fiscal 
policy.
14
 In Lijphart‘s (1999) terms, majoritarian democracies will be more likely to result in 
repression of minorities by majorities. These predictions are supported by a small, but convincing, 
number of empirical studies. The essays in Haggard and McCubbins (2001) use a case study approach 
to show that institutional factors such as presidential power, bicameralism, federalism, and electoral 
rules have an influence on policy choice. De Vanssay and Spindler (1994), Spindler and de Vanssay 
(2002), and de Vanssay et al (2005) look at the relationship between structural constitutional factors 
and economic freedom, generally finding that more veto points increase freedom. Persson and 
Tabellini (2004) find that presidential and majoritarian systems lead to smaller government.     
Given the existence of this literature, the effect of structural rules will be investigated only cursorily 
here. A number of hypotheses suggest themselves: 
1. Countries with proportional electoral systems will restrict press freedom less than those with 
majoritarian systems.  
                                                     
13
 See Mueller (2003) for a detailed overview of the literature. 
14
 From a classical liberal perspective, the comparison of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems is 
interesting in terms of robustness. If we consider bigger government bad, majoritarian systems will be preferable 
under best case assumptions when minority rights are not under threat. In crisis times, though, the higher 
spending may be an acceptable tradeoff for a lower risk of majority oppression.  
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2. Bicameral legislatures will restrict press freedom less than unicameral legislatures.  
3. Federal states will restrict press freedom less than unitary systems.  
4. Presidential systems will restrict press freedom less than parliamentary systems.  
5. Systems with an independent and powerful judiciary will restrict press freedom less than 
those without.    
2.5.2.  Does Parchment Matter? 
Despite much theoretical discussion of whether parchment barriers can constrain government 
behaviour, the question has been empirically neglected. 
Boli-Bennett (1976), Pritchard (1986), and Blasi and Cingranelli (1996) each conduct bivariate 
analyses of the relationship between constitutional protections and respect for human rights. The 
results of these studies were mixed, and their failure to include other independent variables severely 
limits their value.   
Davenport (1996) studies 39 countries from 1948 to 1982, using a pooled cross-sectional time-series 
design. His metric of ―negative sanctions‖ placed on media, political parties, and individual citizens is 
negatively affected (that is, political repression decreases) by constitutional provisions for freedom of 
the press and states of emergency. Interactions between these constitutional provisions and political 
conflict suggest that these provisions protect against political repression more strongly in times of 
conflict.   
Using and OLS pooled cross-sectional design over three years for all fifty U.S. states, Endersby and 
Towle (1997) find that controls on spending written into state constitutions are ineffective or 
counterproductive.  
Cross (1999) shows that institutional factors such as federalism, separation of powers and, most 
strongly, judicial independence predict the respect a government shows for human rights but found no 
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relationship between explicit constitutional provisions and state human rights behaviour (though the 
latter analysis was restricted to only 34 countries).  
Keith (2002) and Keith et al (2009) study the effect of various constitutional guarantees on 
government respect for the right to personal integrity (killings, political imprisonment, torture, 
disappearances, etc). Keith et al (2009) use pooled cross-sectional time-series data for 154-178 
countries – depending on the year – to show that constitutional provisions to fair and public trials 
significantly decrease the level of state terror.  
While investigating the effect of structural constitutional rules, Spindler and De Vanssay (2002) found 
that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion was associated with greater economic 
freedom. They suggest this relationship is mediated by the role of religious pluralism in maintaining 
effective political pluralism.  
While these studies are important contributions and considered as a whole seem to support the 
hypothesis that parchment matters, none has looked specifically at whether constitutional provisions 
have an effect on the particular state behaviour they are designed to limit. Apart from Davenport‘s 
discovery of an interaction between conflict and constitutional protection, nor have they looked 
closely at when parchment matters. 
A number of questions remain to be answered, suggesting the following hypotheses: 
1. Constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press increase press freedom.  
2. Constitutional prohibitions of censorship increase press freedom.  
3. Constitutional provisions (whether press freedom or censorship) are effective mainly when 
press freedom would otherwise be restricted (i.e. Buchanan‘s insurance metaphor is correct). 
4. Constitutional provisions become ineffective in times of crisis (i.e. Higgs‘s argument that 
constitutions are ineffective in times of crisis is correct). 
 
38 
 
2.5.3. Judicial Review 
As discussed above, judicial review could protect freedom in a number of ways. As Alexander 
Hamilton points out in Federalist 78, the judiciary ―has no influence over either the sword or the 
purse‖ and could potentially be completely ignored by other branches of government. Effective 
judicial review requires first that political actors see the court‘s authority as legitimate and binding; 
and second, that the court is committed to enforcing the constitution. Constitutional protections are 
designed as countermajoritarian constraints, and an effective guardian requires a countermajoritarian 
outlook.  
Marshall (1989) finds that three fifths of United States Supreme Court‘s decisions are majoritarian, 
and half of its judicial activism (i.e. the striking down of legislation) is majoritarian. Its decisions are 
especially majoritarian in times of crisis (Marshall 1989: Ch. 4), and agreement with majority opinion 
increases the stability of decisions (Marshall 1989: Ch. 7). This suggests that the Supreme Court is no 
less majoritarian than other government policymakers such as houses of legislature and the president. 
Mishler and Sheehan (1993) find that decisions of the Supreme Court between 1956 and 1980 are 
responsive to changes in public opinion and the preferences of congress and the president. Between 
1981 and 1989, however, they find no such relationship. They explain this change by pointing to a 
string of conservative appointments.  
If the general finding that the Court is responsive to public opinion is correct and can be generalised 
outside the United States, an independent judiciary with the power to review the constitutionality of 
legislation, then, may be best seen as analogous to another house of the legislature. By adding a veto 
point elected under a different set of rules than others, judicial review may protect individual freedom 
even if the court has no respect for the constitution.  
This suggests three possible empirical findings: 
1. Judicial review does not protect press freedom.  
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2. Judicial review protects press freedom regardless of the constitutional provisions for press 
freedom and censorship (i.e. judicial review works as a purely structural constraint by adding an 
extra veto point). 
3. Judicial review protects press freedom only when constitution guarantees press freedom or 
prohibits censorship (i.e. the court acts as guardian of the constitution). 
2.5.4.  Methodology 
To measure the effect of constitutional prohibitions of censorship and guarantees of press freedom on 
the level of actual press freedom at the country level, I used an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression based on a simple general-to-specific modelling procedure (Campos et al 2005).
15
  
As a dependent variable, I chose the 2008 Reporters without Borders index of press freedom.
16
 This 
attempts to measure ―the degree of freedom that journalists and news organisations enjoy in each 
country, and the efforts made by the authorities to respect and ensure respect for this freedom.‖17 The 
index uses a questionnaire
18
 which takes into account the murder, imprisonment, attacks, and threats 
on journalists; the level of censorship, confiscation, search, and harassment to which news 
organisations are subjected; journalistic self-censorship; the level of state monopolisation or 
regulation of news media; and legal penalties for press offences. Each country is given a score on a 0-
100 scale, with 0 being most free.  
The independent variables of primary interest are constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press 
and constitutional prohibition of censorship. I conducted a content analysis of the constitutions of 135 
countries (all of those for which important data such as RSF index, World Bank governance 
                                                     
15
 To deal with heteroscedasticity, I used Stata‘s robust regression procedure. Multicollinearity is bound to be a 
problem whenever we are dealing with measures of good governance, which are highly correlated. As the 
results of the VIF test show, this study is no exception. Multicollinearity, though, inflates variance without 
inducing bias and thus merely attenuates significance levels. The variables of the model were selected through a 
general-to-specific reduction, in which variables are dropped sequentially until only those with a t-statistic 
greater than 1 remain; dropping further variables risks trading precision against specification bias.  Following 
Kennedy‘s (2003) advice, I will accept the inflation in variance rather than risk inducing bias. 
16
 http://www.rsf.org/en-classement794-2008.html 
17
 http://arabia.reporters-sans-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=29013 
18
 http://arabia.reporters-sans-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=29011 
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indicators, and Freedom House freedom index were available, excluding cases with no recognised 
government). Information was taken primarily from online versions of national constitutions. 
Constitutional guarantee of press freedom was coded as 2 if the constitution provided for unqualified 
protection of press freedom, or qualified only with reference to defamation; as 1 if freedom of the 
press was guaranteed but qualified; and as 0 if press freedom is not guaranteed. Constitutional 
prohibition of censorship was coded as 2 if censorship was prohibited without qualification; as 1 if 
prohibition was qualified; and as 0 if not prohibited.  
Also of interest are structural constitutional variables constitutional rigidity;
19
 strength of judicial 
review;
20
 judicial independence;
21
 presidential system;
22
 bicameral legislature;
23
 majoritarian electoral 
rule for lower house;
24
 federal system;
25
 and dictatorship.
26
 Other independent variables in the general 
model were GDP per capita;
27
 Freedom House Freedom of the World Index subscores;
28
 government 
respect for religious freedom and physical integrity rights;
29
 World Bank Governance Indicators;
30
 
The Economist Intelligence Units Democracy Index electoral process subscore;
31
 region;
32
 absolute 
latitude; legal origins;
33
 ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalisation;
34
 and age of constitution. All 
variables are described in Appendix 1.   
                                                     
19
 Using the methodology of La Porta et al (2004), expanded using information from Maddex (2008) as well as 
constitutional documents.  
20
 Using the methodology of La Porta et al (2004), expanded using information from Maddex (2008) as well as 
constitutional documents. 
21
 Cingranelli & Richards (2008). 
22
 Johnson &Wallack (2007). 
23
 Johnson &Wallack (2007). 
24
 Based on information from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. See 
http://www.idea.int/esd/world.cfm 
25
 Based on information from Maddex (2008) and the CIA World Factbook.  
26
 Based on information from Maddex (2008) and the CIA World Factbook.  
27
 CIA world factbook. PPP in 2008 US$, 2008 estimate.  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2004.html 
28
 Electoral process, political pluralism and participation, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, 
and personal autonomy and individual rights. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008 
29
 Cingranelli & Richards (2008). 
30
 Political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp 
31
 http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf 
32
 Based on UN classification.  
33
 La Porta et al (2008). 
34
 Alesinaet al (2003).  
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After removing the least significant of sets of independent variables measuring roughly the same thing 
(such as the World Bank and Freedom House values for the Rule of Law), the most general model 
without interactions contained 36 independent variables. Added to this model were 26 interaction 
variables – (judicial review multiplied by judicial independence to give a measure of effective judicial 
review; and each of the constitutional variables multiplied by de jure judicial review, effective judicial 
review, constitutional rigidity, rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, degree of electoral democracy, personal autonomy, religious freedom, physical integrity 
rights, freedom of association, and  dictatorship) – giving a total of 62 independent variables. The 
least significant variables were removed until only those with a t-stat of one or greater, or those 
included in an interaction with a t-stat of one or greater, remained. This left a model which tested 129 
countries with 42 independent variables, and with an r
2
 of 0.9223. As a robustness check, I also ran 
this reduced set of variables as an ordered logistic regression, with three different divisions of the 
dependent variable (broken into 10 and 20 categories, and rounded to the nearest even number).  
2.6.  RESULTS 
Table 2.1 presents the results of each of these models for selected variables (full regression table in 
appendix).  
Comparing the results of the OLS and ordered logistic regressions, it seems that only the ten-category 
logistic regression closely matches results the results of the OLS. This suggests that the OLS model is 
capable of explaining broad changes in press freedom but not finer movements. With that in mind, the 
remainder of this section will interpret the most interesting results.  
2.6.1. Does Parchment Matter? 
The results suggest that constitutional prohibition of censorship does protect actual press freedom. 
Countries with an unqualified prohibition of censorship score 31 points lower on the index of press 
freedom (i.e. the press is more free). This is just over one and one-third standard deviations. 
Constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press has the expected sign, but the result is not significant. 
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Press freedom provisions do increase press freedom in interaction with control of corruption (that is, 
the provisions matter when corruption is low), but the effect is relatively small. A one standard  
Table 2.1: Selected Regression Results 
 
rsfindex rsf_10 rsf_20 rsf_round2 
Constitution prohibits censorship 
 
-15.5285 -5.387236 -1.780159 -1.359787 
 (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.185) (0.325) 
Constitution guarantees press freedom -6.83121 1.846098 0.8447779 -1.826864 
 (0.356) (0.586) (0.735) (0.453) 
(Constitution prohibits censorship)* -2.62703 -1.088758 -0.7129651 -0.5319672 
(Effective judicial review) (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.045) 
(Constitution guarantees press freedom)* -1.59005 -0.8329569 -0.2834118 -0.2081564 
(Effective judicial review) (0.140) (0.186) (0.403) (0.572) 
(Constitution prohibits censorship)* -5.28417 -1.231046 -1.556122 -1.406685 
(Effective government [World Bank]) (0.009)*** (0.240) (0.034)** (0.051)* 
(Constitution prohibits censorship)* 9.57178 2.5141 1.946914 1.877308 
(Regulatory quality [World Bank]) (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.015)** (0.042)** 
(Constitution guarantees press freedom)*  -4.04274 -2.485171 -1.702165 -0.9700899 
(Control of corruption [World Bank]) (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.037)** 
(Constitution guarantees press freedom)*(  2.19318 0.8324951 0.6029516 0.5264636 
Freedom of association [Freedom House]) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
 
    
 
 
deviation increase in the interaction term decreases the press freedom index by slightly less than eight 
points, around one-third of a standard deviation.  
We cannot be certain that constitutional protections have a causal effect on state repression, since 
countries with a general commitment to freedom of the press may be more likely to prohibit 
censorship in their constitutions. It would be surprising, though, if countries with a commitment to 
press freedom were more likely to prohibit censorship but not provide for general freedom of the 
press. A causal link does seem like the best explanation for these results. If we accept a causal 
relationship between parchment and freedom of the press, the results suggest that constitutional 
n=129 
p values in parentheses 
All variables and interaction terms are described in appendices 1 and 2.  
rsfindex = additive robust OLS regression; R2=0.9223; P>F=0.000; Mean VIF=23.68   
rsf_10 = 10 category robust ordered logit; Pseudo R2=0.6256; P>Chi2=0.000;  
rsf_20 = 20 category robust ordered logit; Pseudo R2=0.5165; P>Chi2=0.000;  
rsf_round2 = rounded robust ordered logit ; Pseudo R2=0.4057; P>Chi2=0.000;  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
p-values are not corrected to account for general-to-specific reduction. 
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provisions are more effective when they are specific and thus contain less scope for governments to 
circumvent the spirit of the constitution.  
2.6.2. When Does Parchment Matter? 
Consistent with Buchanan‘s view of constitutions as insurance, and contra Higgs, prohibition of 
censorship seems to protect press freedom at precisely those times when it might otherwise be 
restricted. The interaction of prohibition of censorship and the World Bank‘s measure of regulatory 
quality has a strongly harmful effect on press freedom. Regulatory quality, as measured by the World 
Bank, seems to be a fairly good proxy for economic liberalism. It includes the absence of trade 
restrictions and other barriers to business formation and operation. This result means that the 
constitutional prohibition of censorship becomes more effective as regulatory quality decreases. For 
those countries with regulatory quality less than zero,
35
 moving from no prohibition to full decreases 
the press freedom index score by almost 70 points – or 2.97 standard deviations. This result is 
significant at the ten percent level of confidence, but, due to greater variance in press freedom for 
countries with lower regulatory quality, we should not take the magnitude of the relationship too 
literally. In countries with regulatory quality greater than one, in contrast, prohibition of censorship 
seems to be harmful to press freedom. This result, however, is small and not statistically significant. 
The interaction between constitutional guarantees of press freedom and Freedom House‘s measure of 
freedom of association is also positive. This means that what little (and statistically insignificant 
overall) effect press freedom provisions have on press freedom outcomes is concentrated in countries 
with low freedom of association. This suggests that constitutional provisions are effective mainly in 
otherwise illiberal countries and in fact seems to be positively harmful in liberal countries (though 
these results are not significant due to a small sample size and large error terms).  
 Prohibition of censorship seems to be effective in protecting press freedom when effective judicial 
review (that is, de jure judicial review multiplied by independence of the judiciary) is high. 
Interestingly prohibition of censorship combined with de jure judicial review seems to hurt press 
                                                     
35
 World Bank Governance indicators have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.  
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freedom. This is surprising but could be due to de jure judicial review lending legitimacy to 
government actions without providing an effective check on those actions. The unexpected results 
discussed below, however, should make any conclusions drawn from the judicial review variables 
tentative.  
2.6.3.  The Effect of Structural Rules 
The results also shed light on what types of structural factors act to protect freedom. Majoritarian 
electoral systems such as first-past-the-post are correlated with less press freedom. This is intuitive 
from a public choice perspective: more proportional systems increase the size of the minimum 
winning coalition and thereby mitigate the tyranny of the majority (Buchanan & Tullock 1962). 
Presidential systems are more likely to restrict press freedom than parliamentary systems. While 
public choice analysis would suggest that separation of the executive and legislative functions of 
government would decrease the potential for tyranny, many actual presidents have wide-ranging 
powers and are in practice unconstrained by the legislative branch. For similar reasons, we should also 
expect bicameralism to increase press freedom. Surprisingly, it does not show a significant effect and 
has the wrong sign. De jure judicial review seems to improve press freedom independently of the 
constitutional variables, while effective judicial review seems to deteriorate it. This is a 
counterintuitive result and I have no plausible explanation.   
2.6.4. Other Results 
As we might expect, government respect for the physical integrity of citizens and their freedom of 
association is positively correlated with press freedom: countries liberal in one sphere will also be 
liberal in others. Freedom House‘s measure of personal autonomy and individual rights, however, is 
significantly negatively correlated with press freedom. This measure, though, includes private actions 
by individuals and firms such as discrimination and the provision of unsafe working conditions. A 
possible interpretation of this result is that government intervention to prevent private discrimination 
and unsafe working conditions increases the score of those countries which are also likely to restrict 
press freedom.  
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Interestingly, the World Bank measures of government effectiveness and control of corruption seem 
to decrease press freedom. A possible interpretation is that once we control for various measures of 
liberalism and good governance outcomes, the efficiency of government allows it to more effectively 
restrict freedom (Crampton and Farrant 2006, 2008).  
Religious fractionalisation seems to increase press freedom. This might suggest that the liberalism 
coming from interaction among those of different worldviews dominates the illiberalism caused by 
conflict between different religious groups.  
2.7. CONCLUSION 
The empirical results above suggest that parchment barriers, if specific, can have a positive impact on 
freedom. De Jasay‘s rejection of constitutional constraints as mere parchment with little or no effect 
on government behaviour is unjustified. 
The fact that constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press are not themselves effective suggests 
that rights need to be clearly and unambiguously specified. A clause stating that ―there shall be no 
censorship‖ leaves less room for interpretation and distortion than ―freedom of the press is 
guaranteed.‖ This, of course, requires the study of different constitutional variables before it can be 
generalised. 
Whereas Davenport (1996) finds interactions between conflict and constitutional protection, by 
including more independent variables I find that constitutional protections interact strongly with 
various measures which tap into the liberalism of government policy. This suggests that constitutional 
protections are most effective when policy is otherwise illiberal: parchment matters most precisely 
when it is needed. While, again, more research is required to ascertain whether this is true of 
constitutional protections in general, this lends support to Buchanan‘s view of constitutions as 
protecting against the worst outcomes and is in conflict with Higgs‘s view of constitutions as 
becoming ineffective in times of crisis. The insurance metaphor for constitutions is appropriate to this 
extent.  
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On the other hand, constitutional guarantees never provide absolute protection against state repression 
but reduce the level of repression which would otherwise occur. Governments frequently go against 
the spirit and the word of their constitutions, and there is never any truly independent and impartial 
enforcer of constitutional constraints. Farrant and Paganelli are correct that Buchanan is not a 
consistent worse-case thinker and that the robustness of constitutional rules is contingent upon their 
enforcement or perceived force among rulers. This makes the standard view of constitutions as the 
―rules of the game‖ of post-constitutional politics problematic.  
While choice at the constitutional level does alter the conditions under which the post-constitutional 
game is played, it can never create an absolutely binding set of rules enforced by an external arbiter. 
Compare the situation of individuals wishing to make a constitutional agreement not to engage in 
certain behaviour at later times to that faced by those wishing to agree on acceptable rules of conduct 
during a sporting event.  
Imagine two boxers about to enter the ring. Each would prefer to win and, suppose, does not much 
care about honour or gamesmanship. The game they face is clearly one of conflict, since they cannot 
both have what they desire. Each also has other preferences, though, which allow for mutually 
advantageous agreement prior to the match. Each wishes to minimise the pain and injury he suffers at 
the hand of his opponent. This being so, each will likely agree to prohibit certain actions and 
otherwise set up the match in such a fashion as to minimise pain and injury. Each would prefer to be 
able to punch the other below the belt, fight bare-knuckle, or wrap their gloves in barbed wire but are 
eager to give up these liberties if their opponent reciprocates: the veil of uncertainty compels each of 
them to promote the general welfare of both at the stage of rule-choice.   
The boxers are also capable of appointing a neutral referee to adjudicate the match. They can grant 
this referee complete power (albeit entirely deriving from convention and perceived legitimacy) to 
enforce the rules and punish violations with penalties or disqualification. They can also limit the 
power of the referee, since a referee who does not enforce the rules neutrally or decides to shoot both 
participants and declare himself the winner will lose legitimacy and no longer be considered the 
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referee. This is where the analogy with constitutional choice becomes problematic. People can make 
agreements at the constitutional level but can never appoint a neutral referee without any interest in 
the outcome of the match. Government is never external to society but merely channels the conflict 
inherent in human relations in different ways. Interests will always sneak in, and representation of 
those interests is unavoidable. The situation is like that of the two boxers who must agree on rules 
without a referee: they can make all the agreements they want but can later renege when it is to their 
advantage. Unenforced agreement may have some force, but when the payoff from violation is 
sufficiently large, the agreement will break down.  
How, then, are they to make credible agreements? Instead of agreeing on formal rules of conduct such 
as ―no hitting below the belt‖ (substantive clauses of a constitution), they will take action which 
actually reduces the capacity to do damage later. The latter strategy, if conducted competently, will be 
self-enforcing. Each contestant would prefer the other wear gloves sufficiently thick to soften the 
blows somewhat. Of course, each would have an incentive to remove the gloves during the fight. 
Realising this, the players may agree to have a representative of the other fasten their gloves in such a 
way as to make them impossible to remove during the match. This reduces the potential damage of 
the contest but does not ensure entirely good behaviour. There will still be hitting below the belt 
(analogous to the violation of some protected individual liberty), but the resulting damage will be 
lessened. This is analogous to structural constitutional constraint like the separation of powers.  
While more investigation is required to ascertain the mechanism through which substantive 
constitutional rules affect government behaviour, the relationship is likely mediated by the 
preferences of political actors and the perceived costs of the prohibited action. A constitutional 
prohibition of censorship does not make censorship impossible, as governments have repeatedly 
demonstrated, but may make voters less supportive of censorship or increase the perceived political 
costs of censorship for government decision makers.  
Unfortunately, much of the normative force of constitutional political economy depends on absolutely 
binding substantive restrictions on government power. Buchanan (2001: 45) states that constitutional 
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rules are designed to ―define the relative spheres for private and governmental action.‖ Since neither 
parchment nor structure is capable of building an impermeable wall between the public and private 
spheres, constitutionalism will fail to deliver on this promise. This reveals a problem with the 
insurance metaphor for constitutional constraint. Where insurance comes with an upfront cost and 
makes us indifferent to subsequent misfortune, constitutional prohibitions seem to reduce the cost of 
misfortune at any point along the spectrum past some threshold. A closer analogy than insurance 
would be a cyclist choosing to wear a helmet. Any accident (desire among political actors for the 
restriction of liberty) will lead to injury (state repression), but the helmet reduces the level of injury 
resulting from crashes of any given severity.   
 While structural rules are more self-enforcing, they are also relatively blunt instruments when 
compared to bills of rights. Supermajority requirements or bicameral legislatures may give extra 
weight to the preferences of minorities relative to unconstrained majoritarianism, but they are not 
capable of protecting particular spheres of private life against interference from the majority. 
Liberalism in general, and the classical liberalism of Buchanan in particular, is committed to avoiding 
what William Galston (2005) calls civic totalism: the tendency of collective choice to encroach on 
every aspect of life, removing the private sphere altogether. Avoiding civic totalism requires not only 
that government be restrained in its policymaking but that some choices must be left entirely to 
individuals. Only substantive rules have the potential to realise the ideal of liberal government. 
Unfortunately, they are never absolute.    
Constitutions never rule out particular political outcomes but simply alter the operation of the political 
system in ways we hope are beneficial on net.  Treating constitutions like binding rules or insurance 
policies obscures this fact. 
 
Chapter Three 
Constitutionalism and Punctuated Public Opinion 
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3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
There has been an increasing recognition among political economists that ideology plays an important 
role in economic and political behaviour. Few analyses, however, have considered the crucial role 
played by social interaction in the dynamics of public opinion. People do not develop ideologies in 
isolation but in interaction with one another. Ideological development is a social process and should 
be of great interest to the social scientist.   
This chapter will draw on the ―punctuated equilibrium‖ literature in political science, as well as the 
phenomenon of availability cascades analysed by economists and legal scholars, to argue that social 
interaction sometimes leads to large spikes in preferences. These preference spikes can have very 
significant effects on political outcomes, particularly the individual freedom people enjoy. The effect 
of such swings in public opinion depends crucially on the set of political institutions with which they 
interact. This relationship, however, is not straightforward.  
I will focus on those structural features of constitutions which erect barriers to policy change by 
increasing the effective majority required for enactment. Following Buchanan and Tullock (1962), 
most liberals have assumed that stronger constraints of this type will unambiguously lead to more 
liberal policy. The increased liberalism stemming from higher effective supermajority requirements 
needs to be weighed only against the increased decision-making costs. I will argue that this is not the 
case and suggest that structural constraints have both costs and benefits in terms of strictly negative 
freedom.      
When some exogenous factor leads to a short-term preference spike in an illiberal direction, structural 
barriers to policymaking will delay the enactment of illiberal policy but also its reversion to 
normality. Further, if the increase in illiberal sentiment is faster than the subsequent reversion, we 
should expect the total duration of illiberal policy to be greater with higher effective majority 
requirements. Structural constraints may prevent some instances of panic policymaking but may also 
worsen the effect of those crises which do become reflected in policy.  
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Without offering a thorough empirical defence of this proposition, I will suggest that alcohol 
prohibition is likely a case in which this happened. More countermajoritarian polities were late to 
enact prohibition and late to repeal it, relative to those based on the majoritarian Westminster model 
of democracy, and lived with prohibition for a longer period in total. While more study is needed to 
confirm this tendency, the prohibition experience is suggestive.  
3.2. IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR 
3.2.1. Preferences versus Incentives  
Methodologically individualist analyses of political behaviour have tended to focus on the incentives 
and constraints facing political actors. Political Economists and other rational choice social scientists 
have generally followed Stigler and Becker‘s (1977) advice to treat preferences and ideology as 
constant across time and individuals and thus not a relevant factor in political and economic analysis. 
While certain subsections of the various structural schools of social science have continued to 
consider ideology,
36
 their analyses are based too heavily on a reified vision of society. This is not the 
place to provide a detailed defence of methodological individualism, and I will direct my argument to 
those who accept the arguments of Hayek (1949) and others who have argued that action ultimately 
derives from the individual, while recognising that individual action is always embedded in a network 
of social relationships (Granovetter 1985; Nooteboom 2007).  
There have, of course, been political theorists broadly classifiable as methodological individualists 
and rational choice theorists who have made ideology a central part of their analysis. Adam Smith and 
John Stuart Mill were both preoccupied with the moral character of humans. More recently, important 
contributions to our understanding of the role of preferences in economic and political decision-
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 Though orthodox Marxism, of course, involves perhaps the most thoroughgoing insistence on the dominance 
of incentives over ideology.  
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making have been made by Ludwig von Mises (1957), Douglass North (1981, 1988), and Robert 
Higgs (1987, 2007).
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This section will argue that our decisions generally, and political decisions in particular, depend 
crucially on both our positive understanding of the world and our normative evaluation of what is 
right, good, and desirable. That is, we act based on our ideology.  
3.2.2. The Importance of Ideology  
Even if we take the idea that people respond to incentives seriously and assume perfect rationality, 
ideology is an unavoidable part of human choice. As Mises (1957: 140) puts it, ―there is no such thing 
as interests independent of ideas, preceding them temporally and logically. What a man considers his 
interest is the result of his ideas.‖ In a basic sense, the subjective nature of preferences means that we 
cannot simply read off the incentives which motivate people from the material situation in which they 
find themselves. Looking at the phenomenon of fashion makes this obvious. The demand for musical 
performances of power ballads peaked in the 1980s and has since fallen to a much lower level. This 
can only be explained by a change in people‘s musical tastes, not by changing constraints and 
opportunities in the physical world.
38
  
In addition to this evaluative component of ideology, Mises points to the descriptive aspect of 
ideology. Even taking preferences as given, it is our ideology which helps us make sense of the world 
in order to pursue our goals. Humans do not make decisions as disembodied calculators, as Chicago 
School price theory sometimes seems to suggest, but as boundedly rational agents relying on 
internalised heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman 1974) and external institutions (North 1993; Smith 
1962, 2003). The most effective means of pursuing our preferences is seldom obvious and action will 
thus depend on our descriptive understanding of how the world works.  
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 For other analyses combining methodological individualism, rational choice, and ideology see Hummel 
(1990, 2001); Caplan and Stringham (2005); Stringham and Hummel (2009); Taylor and Crampton (2009).  
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 It could be objected that the underlying preferences remain unchanged, with changing social incentives 
altering the demand for particular types of music or clothing. This may be so, but it is expressed preferences 
which are relevant to the argument presented here. Fashion changes preferences over goods, even if only 
through reputational pressures.  
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The fact that ideology is important to choice does not necessarily make it a relevant explanatory factor 
for the social scientist. If individuals‘ ideological commitments were the result of random chance and 
independent of one another, there would be nothing interesting to say about ideology. This is not the 
case. Our ideology, in both its normative and descriptive aspects, is shaped by the ideology of those 
around us.  
3.2.3. Ideology and Political Behaviour 
While no human choice is ever devoid of an ideological component, there is reason to think that 
political choices in particular will be detached from the constraints and opportunities of the material 
world and dominated by ideology. Rational choice social science has generally assumed that people 
act rationally in all spheres of life and regardless of the institutional environment. Public choice 
theory is quite explicit in its insistence that people are guided by utility maximisation in the political 
sphere just as strongly as in the market. Buchanan (1983: 13-14) insists that individual utility 
maximisation is the appropriate lens with which to study both market and political choice, suggesting 
that ―the burden of proof should rest with those who suggest that wholly different models of man 
apply in the political and economic realms of behavior.‖ While there have always been economists 
stressing the importance of the institutional environment in which choice is made (Simon 1956, Smith 
1962, 2003; Ostrom 1990; North 1993) and other social scientists pointing to the symbolic nature of 
politics (Edelman 1964, 1971; Gusfield 1963), the most compelling answer to the behavioural 
symmetry hypothesis has come from within the public choice school itself.  
Brennan and Lomasky (1993) accept the idea that individuals act to maximise utility in the voting 
booth just as they do in the market. The incentives faced by voters, though, mean that they will not 
necessarily vote for policies which, if enacted, would most satisfy their preferences. The paradox of 
voting identified by Downs (1957) implies that since the probability of casting the decisive ballot is 
vanishingly small, the individual voter has no incentive to become informed of the merit of alternative 
policies. The benefits of becoming so informed will almost always outweigh the costs. Rational 
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people will choose to remain rationally ignorant.
39
 Of course, this leaves unanswered the question of 
why people choose to vote at all. The costs of getting to the voting booth to cast one‘s ballot are not 
particularly high, but it is hard to see how they could be less than the expected benefit of a single vote 
in terms of electoral outcomes. How, then, are we to explain the high levels of voter turnout we see in 
reality? 
Brennan and Lomasky point out that people act for two basic reasons: to bring about some state of 
affairs or because they value the action in itself. That is, people act to satisfy both their instrumental 
and expressive utility. Expressive utility includes the warm feeling we get from indulging our biases 
and ideological commitments. In everyday economic life, our choices have consequences and, 
according to Brennan and Lomasky, instrumental concerns will dominate. In the voting booth, though, 
our choices are never decisive and we thus do not face their consequences. With the instrumental 
value of political behaviour being so low, expressive concerns will come to dominate. Voting, as 
Brennan and Hamlin (1998: 150) put it, is ―much more like cheering at a football match than . . . 
purchasing an asset portfolio.‖ 
If a voter has a mild distaste for dark-skinned people, for example, he might vote for policies which 
harm them even when he would be unwilling to incur the costs of those policies were he the decisive 
voter. Roback‘s (1986) study, which shows that streetcars were segregated in the antebellum South 
through democratic politics when there was insufficient consumer demand to enforce such a policy in 
the market, is a historical example of instrumentally irrational but expressively rational voting in 
action. Even most racists would have been better off, all things considered, without the law enforced 
but voted for it anyway.  
Caplan (2007) makes a similar argument. For him, people have preferences over beliefs: we derive 
utility from believing things which make us feel better about the world and ourselves, even if those 
beliefs are irrational in an epistemological sense. Caplan argues that irrationality is a normal good in 
that people demand more at lower prices. In the political sphere, the individual consequences of 
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irrational beliefs are practically zero and so voters will consume irrationality to the point of satiation. 
Voters believe whatever they feel like believing without concern for the consequences.  
Political economists focusing on the role of interest groups (Olson 1971; Tullock 1967; Krueger 
1974) sometimes come close to denying the relevance of the dominant ideology on political 
outcomes. Several empirical studies, however, have shown that public policy is generally consistent 
with public opinion (Page & Shapiro 1983; Caplan & Stringham 2005) and responsive to changes in 
public opinion (Crampton 2002; Althaus 2003).  
3.3.  PUNCTAUTED PUBLIC OPINION 
3.3.1. The Case for Punctuated Public Opinion 
The above analysis suggests that ideology and preferences are of crucial importance in understanding 
the operation of political institutions and evaluating their robustness. Of course, preferences are never 
stable in the long term, and we need to consider cultural change. Robust political economy requires 
that we take a dynamic view of both institutions and ideology. If politics is not primarily governed by 
instrumental self-interest but expressive preferences, rational irrationality, and symbolic signalling; a 
rational-choice approach to political change is not sufficient.  
We need to consider the social dynamics of ideology. One aspect of cultural change is the slow, long-
term evolution which becomes obvious when we compare attitudes of people today with those of past 
generations. People in developed nations today have very different attitudes towards race and 
sexuality than was the case a century ago, for example. While this type of change may well be the 
dominant factor determining the freedom people enjoy, a more pertinent dynamic for institutional 
design is the possibility of fast, short-term changes in political preferences. Whereas a steady change 
in preferences will very likely find its way into policy under in any institutional environment, the 
effect of short-term fluctuations in preferences depends on the particular mechanisms by which 
preferences become policy. This will be the subject of this chapter. 
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There are good theoretical and empirical reasons for thinking preferences might be characterised by 
long periods of stability and short bursts of rapid change. The punctuated equilibrium literature in 
political science has documented rapid changes in those issues accepted as being on the political 
agenda (Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner & Jones 1991, 1993; True et al 1999). Punctuated equilibrium 
theory suggests that policy is normally subject to negative feedback and political outcomes will 
exhibit a significant degree of inertia. Most policy issues, most of the time, are contained within a 
―policy subsystem‖ of political elites and draw little attention from the public at large. This 
containment leads to negative feedback and significant policy stability. The dominance of these iron 
triangles (Adams 1981) of the legislature, bureaucracy, and interest groups is occasionally broken 
down as the issue is put on the public‘s agenda, however. This leads to a situation in which positive 
feedback comes to dominate and we see large shifts in preferences and policy, leading to a new steady 
state. This dynamic of long periods of stasis punctuated by phases of rapid change is particularly 
pronounced in the United States, where conservative political institutions reinforce the status quo and 
require significant pressure to build before policy change becomes feasible. Policy regarding crime, 
environmental issues, drug regulation, gun control, healthcare, and education has been found by 
various scholars to be in line with the punctuated equilibrium model (True et al 2009: 163).      
Moral panics (Cohen 1972; Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994) also involve rapid changes in public 
understandings and policy preferences. According to Cohen, moral panics involve a salient event 
shifting the public attention to some supposed threat to existing ways of life. Some group is identified 
as the force behind this threat and caricatured in the media as a ―folk devil.‖ This easy-to-digest image 
of danger leads to a snowballing of public attention and frequently results in regulation as political 
elites recognise the political opportunity present in such panics. Cohen focuses on the Mod and 
Rocker youth subcultures as the object of past panics. Other examples include more recent youth 
subcultures (such as ravers and boy-racers), drugs, pornography, and inner-city violence. In each case, 
a previously unrecognised issue becomes extremely salient with public concern feeding back upon 
itself. 
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The tendency for preferences to become self-reinforcing at the population level at certain points in 
time has recently been studied by scholars in law and economics. The public availability of expressed 
opinions can lead to cascades of stated opinions. Kuran and Sunstein (1999) offer an overview of 
these arguments and relate them to risk regulation. ―Availability cascades‖ come in two basic forms: 
reputational and informational. Reputational cascades occur when people keep quiet or actively falsify 
their preferences in order to secure social benefits or avoid social costs. As more people come to 
conform to the publicly desirable behaviour, the costs of others dissenting increases. Reputational 
pressures are thus self-reinforcing (Akerlof 1976; Kuran 1989, 1991, 1995). Informational cascades 
operate similarly but are based on factual opinions rather than beliefs. If many people express belief in 
some proposition, those who would otherwise believe the opposite are sent a strong signal that the 
majority has private information to which they are not privy (Bikhchandani et al 1992; Banerjee 1992; 
Hirshleifer 1995; Sunstein 2000). In both cases, a biased pool of available public preferences or 
beliefs becomes self-reinforcing.  
Kuran (1995) argues that preference falsification has significant social consequences. Kuran 
distinguishes between an individual‘s public opinion – the views he openly expresses on a particular 
issue – and private opinion – the way he privately feels. Our public opinion depends not simply on our 
private opinion but also on the social incentives we face. Each person will place different relative 
weights on expressing their true preferences and pursuing social advantage.  
The effect of hiding an already unpopular belief or disposition – such as a particular political view or 
sexual attraction to one‘s own gender – is to increase the social cost of others revealing a similar 
preference. There could, then, be a significant section of society whose private opinion differs 
drastically from their professed public opinion. Because each closeted individual considers the 
opinion extremely rare, none is willing to reveal it publicly. In addition to making preference 
falsification more likely among others, this can alter the underlying distribution of true preferences. 
Once a lie is told sufficiently often, even the liar may come to believe it sincerely, and the next 
generation will not have access to arguments divergent from the dominant ideology.  
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This creates stability in expressed public opinion (Kuran 1987) but can lead to abrupt shifts once a 
few are prompted to reveal their true preferences by some exogenous shock, which then prompts 
those with a relatively low threshold of preference revelation to come out of the closet, which then 
prompts still more to reveal themselves. A few voices of dissent, then, can create a tipping point 
which gives rise to unforeseen revolutions in public opinion (Kuran 1989, 1991). Kuran points to the 
fall of communism and the French Revolution as examples. 
Even in the absence of such reputational pressures, beliefs can become self-reinforcing due to a biased 
pool of expressed factual judgements from which individuals form and update their beliefs. The limits 
of human cognition mean that the judgements of others influence our beliefs. This is entirely rational, 
since it is usually safe to assume that others have good reason for holding their beliefs and 
piggybacking on their cognitive efforts saves us time and effort.  
The classic ―urn game‖ in game theory illustrates the epistemic rationality of conformity. In this 
game, players are faced with two outwardly identical urns, one contains two white balls and one 
yellow ball, the other contains two yellow balls and one white ball. One urn is chosen at random and 
players take turns to publicly guess its contents. Each player draws a ball from the urn without 
showing the other players and makes their guess, with full knowledge of the previous guesses of 
others. This will produce a misleading informational cascade whenever early players happen to draw 
the less common ball from the urn, with subsequent guesses providing no relevant information. 
Bikhchandani et al (1992) model individuals as basing their behaviour on some combination of a 
private signal they receive as to the benefits and costs of performing some action and a social signal 
they receive from the actions of others. As the social consensus on the most advantageous course of 
action increases, so does the strength of the social signal. Past some threshold, an individual will 
completely ignore their private signal (that is, their own best judgement) and follow the crowd.  
This will increase the strength of the social signal for others, compelling those with a higher threshold 
to conform and triggering an informational cascade. Like a reputational cascade, this can mean that 
everyone ends up holding a belief most would reject if left to decide on the matter in isolation: the 
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blind lead the blind. If Alice shares her belief in proposition X with Bob - who would otherwise 
believe not-X but sees Alice as better informed and so comes to believe X - Carol would need to have 
a strong conviction in not-X in order to remain convinced despite the disagreement of her fellows.  As 
more people are exposed to this social consensus, the social signal becomes overwhelming even if 
Alice is the only one whose personal judgement favours X.  
Kuran and Sunstein (1999) point to the panics over Love Canal, Alar, and TWA Flight 800 as cases 
where reputational and informational cascades combined to create biased risk judgments and 
excessive policy responses.  
The nature of politics makes the political preferences particularly susceptible to reputational cascades. 
The arguments of Brennan and Lomasky (1993) and Caplan (2007) discussed above show that 
political behaviour is almost entirely divorced from practical consequences. In the midst of a 
reputational cascade, then, the individual has no incentive to calmly look at the evidence to adjust 
their political preferences to reality and every incentive to go with the crowd.  
There seems, then, to be two broad classes of abrupt changes in public opinion. Some, such as the 
unforeseen revolutions discussed by Kuran, involve one stable equilibrium being abruptly displaced 
by another. In these cases, the transition is fast, but the effects are lasting. While political institutions 
may have significant welfare consequences during the period of change, by slowing or speeding the 
reaction of policy to changing preferences, the long-term policy outcomes are likely to be similar in 
most institutional environments. The other class of abrupt policy change occurs when a long-run 
opinion equilibrium is disturbed for a short period before returning to normal. The risk perception 
panics described by Kuran and Sunstein (1999) and moral panics seem to fit this pattern. The political 
consequences of these short-term spikes in preferences are potentially more sensitive to the 
institutional environment in which they occur and this type of preference volatility will be the concern 
of this chapter.   
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3.3.2. The Political Consequences of Preference Spikes  
Unfortunately for the liberal, there is good reason to think that preference spikes are more likely to 
happen in an illiberal than liberal direction. Given that preference spikes are generally triggered by 
some exogenous salient event or crisis, panicked reaction is likely to dominate reasoned debate. 
Sunstein (2000: 96) suggests that some arguments have a rhetorical advantage over others. Punitive 
damages awarded by juries, for example, almost always increase with deliberation whenever the 
average pre-deliberation preference is above zero. Sunstein suggests that this is due to the rhetorical 
asymmetry favouring those arguing for more severe penalties. ―He did a horrible thing!‖ and ―The 
poor victim!‖ are more powerful arguments than ―Well, he did wrong, but let‘s not get carried away.‖ 
Caplan (2007) shows that people have policy positions systematically biased against the market, 
against foreigners, towards employment rather than production, and towards pessimism when 
compared with economists, whom he argues are experts in policy analysis. This difference persists 
even after controlling for income, party identification, and other factors known to influence policy 
positions. He concludes that the median voter would be far more liberal in these respects if they 
understood economics.  
Given that the human mind evolved in an environment very different than that we face today, this is 
not surprising (Rubin 2001, 2003; Kanazawa 2004; Shermer 2007). The most relevant period in 
considering the peculiarly human aspects of behaviour and intelligence seems to be the Pleistocene, 
the period from around 1.8 million years ago until the birth of agriculture ten thousand years ago. It is, 
of course, dangerous to speculate exactly what life was like for the humans and proto-humans in this 
period, especially since there was likely a lot of variation across time and space. All available 
evidence seems to suggest, however, that people lived in groups of less than 200 people (Rubin 2001; 
Buller 2005: 58-63). The minimal and highly plausible assumption that people lived in small groups 
during the Pleistocene is enough to reach interesting conclusions about cognitive traits which now 
seem ill-suited to our current environment. 
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The most obvious of these is the tendency for zero-sum thinking. As Adam Smith pointed out more 
than two centuries ago, ―The division of labour is limited by the extent of the market‖ (Smith 1776: 
Book 1, Ch. 3). In the Pleistocene, the extent of the market was quite limited, since small groups are 
not conducive to specialisation. In an environment without gains from trade, it makes sense to see any 
transfer of resources between two people as just that – pure transfer. In this environment without 
production, the resources available would have been more or less fixed. If Alice ate a piece of meat, 
Bob would have to go without. The Pleistocene world would have economically approximated a zero-
sum game. One person's gain would have largely been another another's loss and it would make little 
sense to differentiate between the allocative and productive aspects of trade, since the latter would 
barely have existed (Rubin 2003: 161). 
This has the potential to cause illiberal preference spikes when the majority of the population see 
some minority doing well economically. Our zero-sum bias leads people to assume that those getting 
ahead must be stepping on someone‘s toes and leads to popular calls for action. When combined with 
our anti-foreign bias, which is also the result of our evolutionary past, this can lead to some rather 
horrific policy outcomes, as the rise of National Socialism demonstrated most clearly. Contemporary 
anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States and elsewhere is a more typical example. Whenever 
preferences spike regarding the appropriate response to some minority group such as Jews and 
Immigrants, it is very likely to spike in an illiberal direction. ―They took our jobs!‖40 is a more 
compelling argument for most people than anything the liberal side can muster in times of crisis.   
More generally, Doing Something about a problem has a rhetorical advantage over not doing anything 
in group deliberation. In the Pleistocene, where action was taken by individuals or small groups, 
doing something to address a potential problem was generally a good idea, since the unintended 
consequences at such a small scale are normally negligible.
41
 When demanding action at a societal 
level, though, unintended consequences are ubiquitous. As Mises (1920) and Hayek (1937) showed 
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 Attempts to cure illness with crude and dangerous medical practices may be a counterexample. See Millikan 
(1998) for a history of iatrogenic disease. 
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during the socialist calculation debate, society as a whole is not something which any human 
decision-maker can control centrally. Evolution, though, has conditioned us to innately have the fatal 
conceit that such central planning is possible. Consequently, whenever a problem arises, people are 
much more likely to support government intervention than restraint.  
While there may be cases in which the liberal position has a rhetorical advantage (taxation, perhaps), 
the general tendency seems to be for preference spikes to be interventionist. While I offer no rigorous 
empirical case for this proposition here, history seems to confirm its generality. Robert Higgs‘s 
(1987,1988, 2006, 2007) study of American history shows that crises of various sorts tend to lead to 
the growth of government and the abrogation of economic and civil liberties. While there are some 
examples of abrupt shifts in preferences in a liberal direction, such as that accompanying the end of 
communism and the acceptance of homosexuality in western democracies, these have tended to 
involve a punctuated shift to a new stable equilibrium, rather than a short-term spike.  
3.3.3. Robustness to Volatile Preferences 
The effects of preference spikes depend on the political institutions through which they are filtered. 
Political institutions can be seen as alternative technical mechanisms of converting the preferences of 
the population into enforceable rules of conduct. It is tempting to suppose that we should prefer those 
institutions which do this most efficiently. Calls for ―more democratic‖ institutions generally reflect a 
desire for policy more responsive to changing public opinion. With irrational voters, responsiveness to 
public opinion is not necessarily desirable, and in some situations we should be grateful for 
inefficiencies in the transformation of preferences into policy.  
Political economists have been rightly concerned about the problematic principal-agent relationship 
between voters and politicians. Any slack in the relationship which allows politicians to act in ways 
contrary to the preferences of voters provides opportunities for corruption. If voters cannot fully 
control politicians, there is scope for policymakers to enrich themselves at the expense of the public. 
However, Crampton (2003: 65-79) shows that the agency costs of knavish policymakers needs to be 
62 
 
weighed against the costs of foolish voter preferences. The optimal level of slack in the principal-
agent relationship is, therefore, above zero.  
The effect of preference spikes on policy under alternative sets of political institutions is not 
straightforward. While particular rights and liberties delimited in the constitution may have some 
effect via those mechanisms described in the previous chapter, structural constraints designed to make 
policy change more difficult will have consequences in all policy areas and will be my concern in this 
section. For analytical simplicity, I will treat all those structural rules which increase the size of the 
minimum coalition required to change policy into one metric of majority requirement. I will also 
ignore the agency costs of self-serving politicians and consider only the costs and benefits associated 
with a political system which transforms voter preferences more or less efficiently into policy.  
The most obvious effect of preference spikes on structural constraints is to render them less effective 
at preventing policy change based on short-term fluctuations in preferences. The logic of 
informational and reputational cascades implies that as the proportion of the population supporting 
some policy increases, so does the likelihood that more still will come to support it. If we are 
weighing the benefits of more closely approximating unanimity against increased decision-making 
costs, as in Buchanan and Tullock (1962), the phenomenon of group polarisation should tilt the 
balance towards lower majority requirements (i.e. less constrained policymaking), since the benefit of 
greater consensus is less than previously thought. On the other hand, the same effect might lead us to 
prefer higher majority requirements as the less stringent rules no longer offer an adequate level of 
protection.
42
  
In addition to reducing the benefit of structural constraints, the existence of preference spikes means 
that constitutional constraint can be positively costly, even on the most libertarian of grounds. 
Constitutional rules such as supermajority requirements and bicameral legislatures designed to make 
policy change more difficult will reduce the chances that a preference spike will be reflected in policy. 
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that either will dominate in the abstract.  
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On the other hand, if policy does respond to the preference spike, structural barriers may delay the 
reversion to normality and, in extreme cases, could even lock in unpopular policies indefinitely.
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Assuming that the same level of support is required to enact an illiberal policy as to repeal it, the 
extreme case of permanent lock-in would occur whenever support for the illiberal policy spiked 
sufficiently to pass the policy, and support for repeal never becomes sufficient to reverse the policy. 
This would be likely to occur if there were a proportion of the population greater than one minus the 
supermajority requirement always supporting the illiberal policy, perhaps on religious grounds. Such 
a situation is depicted in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1.: Supermajority requirement locks in bad policy. 
 
Suppose that the threshold for changing policy is set at .75. Since support for the illiberal policy 
exceeded this level before returning to normal but never became weak enough for the policy to be 
repealed, the policy will be locked in. Were the required majority set to 50%, we would have expected 
to see shorter bouts of illiberalism earlier but would not be stuck in the illiberal equilibrium forever. It 
is not clear which state of affairs is preferable. 
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and sunset clauses which are sensitive to the importance of time. These will be discussed below.  
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More realistically, structural constraints could slow the reversion to liberal policy after the preference 
spike has subsided. We should expect such a dampening to happen with any preference spike, but in 
some situations it may lead to a longer total period of illiberal policy. Whether this is the case depends 
on the relative speed of preference change on the rise and fall of the preference spike. If support for 
illiberal policy increases faster than it subsequently declines, we should expect the period of 
illiberalism accompanying the spike to increase with the required supermajority. Unfortunately, this 
fast rise and slow decay in illiberal sentiment is exactly what moral panics and reputational cascades 
should lead us to expect. This situation is depicted in Figure 3.2. Since the spike comes on much 
faster than it degrades, the duration of illiberal policy is greater under the 75 percent supermajority 
rule than under simple majority.  
Figure 3.2.: Supermajority requirement prolongs bad policy. 
 
Once we consider the dynamics of agenda setting, short-term preference spikes may be even more 
likely to increase the half-life of bad policies, or lock them in permanently. It is not only the 
proportion of voters supporting repeal which will determine the duration of a policy but also the 
salience of the issue and the resulting incentives of political actors. The attention given to a particular 
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issue at any one time seems far more volatile than the proportion of voters which support one or 
another policy response to that issue (Downs 1972). Where punctuated equilibrium theory, 
availability cascades, and moral panics see stasis as the norm occasionally but consequentially 
disrupted by abrupt change; agenda-setting theory sees a cycling among various issues as the standard 
dynamic of issue attention.     
Zhu (1992) models the agenda-setting process as zero-sum competition between issues, with an 
increase in attention given to one issue generally leading to decreased attention among others. Mass 
media and public attention has a limited carrying capacity and, generally speaking, only 5-7 issues can 
remain salient at any one time (McCombs & Zhu 1995). This hypothesis is supported by measures of 
salience derived from media coverage and opinion polls asking respondents about important issues. 
McCombs & Zhu (1995) show that issues tend to remain on the public agenda for a limited time. 
While certain enduring issues such as jobs, government spending, and foreign policy remain very 
salient for years at a time; others, such as welfare, health, the environment, and education remain 
salient for less than six months on average.   
This suggests another important aspect of preference spikes. In addition to an increase in illiberal 
preferences, panics of various sorts also make an issue extremely salient for a short time, before it 
returns to obscurity. Wien and Elmelund-Præstekær (2009) show that media hypes, which generally 
accompany moral panics, occur regularly and each last only around three weeks.  
If we assume that politicians are bound by electoral incentives to campaign on issues the public finds 
important, this could lead to a lock-in of bad policies even when widely, but latently, opposed by a 
very large majority. Pursuing policy change expends resources and political capital and will only 
prove worthwhile when there are votes to be gained or interest groups to be wooed. If the policy leads 
to strong and widespread dissatisfaction, there are advantages to putting repeal on the political 
agenda. If few people notice the effects of the policy, or are tired of hearing about the issue due to 
overexposure during the panic, pursuing repeal is unlikely to be a wise political move. This means 
that we are likely to see a ratcheting of unwanted policies which could have a significant aggregate 
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effect (Higgs 1987). We should expect this to be particularly so in countries with strong structural 
barriers to policy change. The web of regulations which exist in the United States when compared to 
less constrained democracies provides anecdotal evidence of this hypothesis.  
3.4. ALCOHOL PROHIBITION  
The experience of alcohol prohibition in the early twentieth century seems to be a case of a spike in 
preferences (albeit a protracted one) leading to illiberal policy, with structural constraints slowing 
repeal. There was a rush to prohibit alcohol in a number of countries around the world, followed by a 
similar rush for repeal. Historians such as Sinclair (1962) and Kobler (1973) have pointed out the 
dramatic swings in public opinion regarding alcohol prohibition, and Schrad (2007) explicitly 
conceptualises the rise and fall of prohibition as an instance of policy punctuation due a shift from 
negative to positive feedback.   
The spikiness of public opinion is particularly obvious when it comes to national prohibition in the 
United States. Despite the daunting institutional barrier of a constitutional amendment, large alliances 
were formed to pass the Eighteenth Amendment and to reverse it thirteen years later. This involved an 
enormous shift in public opinion which only becomes understandable once we consider the self-
reinforcing nature of political ideas at the population level. While there had long been a temperance 
movement in the United States, as well as those other countries and provinces which would eventually 
prohibit alcohol, widespread support for prohibition at the national level seems to have come on quite 
quickly. Reliable measures of public opinion are hard to come by, but the available evidence suggests 
that prohibition was due to a very rapid spike in preferences around 1912-15 with support remaining 
high until around 1920, before falling off quickly, though not as quickly as it had increased in the first 
place. If this stylised story is true, we should expect structural barriers, when not strong enough to 
prevent prohibition altogether, to delay both the enactment and repeal of prohibition and to increase 
its total duration.   
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Using data from the Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature between 1890 and 1950, Schrad shows 
that media attention to alcohol prohibition increased dramatically beginning around 1915.
44
 While 
there was a generally favourable attitude towards national prohibition among articles prior to this 
time, it was not until around 1911 that support became stable at high levels. The imbalance in 
coverage quickly dropped to approximate parity around 1921, once the Eighteenth Amendment had 
come into force, before beginning a steady trend towards greater disapproval from 1925.
45
 There was 
also a sharp but brief spike in support for national prohibition among the media in 1908. This suggests 
that in countries like the United States where policy change takes some time, preference spikes will 
not alter policy unless support stays high for some time. 
The Literary Digest ran opinion polls on the prohibition question in 1922, 1930, and 1932.
46
 The 1922 
poll was mailed to over ten million people, of which around 922,000 replied. In 1930, over twenty 
million were queried, with over 4.8 million responses. In 1932, there were around 4.7 million 
responses. The sample size of these polls, then, is not a problem, and they represented a noble early 
attempt at scientific polling. They were, however, biased in a number of respects (Willcox 1931; 
Robinson 1933). Factors favouring wets were an overrepresentation of men and city dwellers, and the 
discouragement from participating in the polls by Dry leaders. In the other direction, the polls 
included a disproportionate number of wealthy people, who were more likely to be dry. There were, 
then, biases heading in both direction. Robinson (1933) argues that the net bias was towards wets. 
Willcox (1931) suggests the opposite. I will not take sides on this dispute, since it is the trends in 
support which are of most interest here. Assuming each of the polls was biased in roughly the same 
way, their comparison remains useful.  
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 Hart (1933) makes a similar analysis, though for a shorter period. His results are consistent with Schrad‘s. 
45
 Part of this dramatic shift in media attention is likely due to the relative effectiveness of wets and dries over 
the period in question to have their voices heard. In the drive for prohibition, the dries pioneered many highly 
effective techniques of communication. Columnists in dry organisations‘ employ posed as neutral journalists, 
and pressure was placed on newspapers by those in a position to withdraw advertising revenue. Less 
offensively, and possibly more effectively, dry organisations provided press-ready copy and statistics which 
decreased the cost to newspapers and magazines of running stories favouring prohibition. This increased dry 
influence through a mechanism similar to that described in the political sphere by Hall and Deardorff (2006). 
These same techniques were later utilised by wets. The early overrepresentation of dry sentiment in the press 
due to deceit and journalistic subsidy, then, was later replaced by a similar overrepresentation of support for 
repeal (Sinclair 1962: 310-311).   
46
 The Literary Digest (1933) provides the results of each of these polls. 
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While these polls tell us nothing about the rise of prohibition sentiment, they do reveal the dramatic 
fall in support. In 1922, 38 percent of respondents were in favour of continued enforcement of the 
Eighteenth amendment, with 41 percent preferring modification to allow beers and light wines, and 21 
percent supporting repeal.  By 1930, the number favouring repeal had reached 40 percent, with the 
remaining 60 percent split approximately evenly between enforcement and modification. In 1932, the 
question was modified to a binary choice between continuance and repeal. When given this stark 
choice, 74 percent preferred repeal.  
It seems reasonable, then, to think of support for national alcohol prohibition in the early twentieth 
century as a preference spike. Support for prohibition grew quickly, remained high for a few years 
and then degraded until opposition was overwhelming.
47
 Exposing the consequences of this 
preference spike in different institutional contexts, however, is far from straightforward. The small 
sample size combined with the myriad potentially confounding factors makes a rigorous statistical test 
impossible. Looking at the experience of those democracies which enacted prohibition, however, does 
provide a moderately compelling anecdotal case that more significant structural barriers increased the 
duration of alcohol prohibition.  
Since only a few countries prohibited alcohol during the relevant period, some of these being non-
democracies (Russia/USSR) or predominantly Muslim (Turkey), I will include Canadian provinces in 
my analysis. Analysing U.S. States would not be useful due to the existence of national prohibition 
interrupting the natural progression of legislation, as well as the lack of variation in constitutional 
constraints among the States. Including countries with national prohibition as well as Canadian 
provinces gives a total of 15 democracies, which are listed in Table 3.1, along with the years in which 
alcohol prohibition was in force
 48
  and a classification as either a consensus, moderate, or 
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 It is possible that the drop in support is due to voters being exposed to the negative effects of the policy, rather 
than a short-term spike which would subside regardless of enactment. This possibility does little to change the 
argument presented here, however, as structural barriers will delay reversion to policy normality regardless of 
what causes the drop in support. 
48
 Prince Edward Island is coded as having prohibition only until 1930, despite the fact that de jure prohibition 
remained in force until 1948, since de facto prohibition had ended by 1930.  Davis (1990: 327-334) argues that 
liquor was just as easy to obtain in Prince Edward Island after 1930 as in the other Maritime provinces, where 
prohibition had officially ended. Between 1930 and 1948, there was a large increase in government revenue 
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majoritarian democracy in Lijphart‘s (1999) terms.49 Table 3.2 provides the mean years of enactment, 
repeal, and duration broken down by the level of structural constraint.  
Table 3.1 
  Enactment Repeal Duration 
Type of 
Democracy 
United States 1920 1933 13 Consensus 
Finland 1917 1932 15 Consensus 
Iceland  1915 1922 7 Moderate  
Norway* 1919 1927 8 Moderate  
Estonia 1918 1920 2 Moderate  
Newfoundland 1915 1924 9 Majoritarian 
Alberta  1916 1924 8 Majoritarian 
British Columbia  1917 1921 4 Majoritarian 
Manitoba 1916 1923 7 Majoritarian 
New Brunswick 1917 1927 10 Majoritarian 
Nova Scotia 1916 1930 14 Majoritarian 
Ontario 1916 1927 11 Majoritarian 
Quebec 1919 1919 0 Majoritarian 
Saskatchewan 1916 1924 8 Majoritarian 
Prince Edward 
Island**  1901 1930 29 Majoritarian 
*Partial prohibition        
  
** End date indicates approximate end of de facto prohibition.  
 
Table 3.2 
  Mean Enactment Mean Repeal Mean Duration N 
Consensus  1918.5 1932.5 14 2 
Moderate 1917.3 1923 5.7 3 
Majoritarian 1914.9 1924.9 10 10 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
from taxes on ―medicinal‖ liquor sales, which allowed those within ten miles of a dispensary to purchase 24 oz 
of hard liquor per day, and those further away to purchase double this. The black market in liquor, which had 
always accounted for most of the alcohol consumed on Prince Edward Island, increased dramatically during this 
time, with little action taken by authorities (Robinson & Robinson 1995). Many wets felt ambivalent about the 
repeal of prohibition, since it was unclear whether the alternative of government monopoly supply would make 
alcohol more available.    
49
 Assuming that Presidential veto, bicameralism, and proportional representation all increase the effective 
majority required for policy change, I have classified any country/province with two or more of these features as 
consensus, with one as moderate, and with none as majoritarian. This is a fairly coarse distinction, but the 
available data simply do not allow finer-grained comparisons.  
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While Norway never prohibited alcohol completely, its partial prohibition was motivated by similar 
dry sentiment and produced similar social problems. It is therefore included in the analysis.  
Even though a majority of the population had expressed support for prohibition before the turn of the 
twentieth century, Canada never prohibited alcohol at a national level. A non-binding referendum in 
1898 found 51.2 percent of the country in favour of prohibition, including majorities in every 
province expect Quebec, which voted overwhelmingly against. The Canadian government did not act 
on this, however, since many felt that the margin was too slim to justify imposing prohibition on 
Quebec, and, in any case, alcohol was being prohibited at a local level in many parts of the country 
(Dupré 2008: 6).  
Every province in Canada did eventually pass laws completely banning the sale of alcoholic 
beverages. This is true even of Quebec, despite the overwhelming opposition from its predominantly 
French and Catholic population. While a total ban was passed, it was emasculated to exclude beer, 
wine, and cider before it was to come into effect in 1919 and was abandoned altogether the following 
year (Dupré 2008: 11-12). Quebec, then, never had absolute prohibition and had partial prohibition 
only very briefly. I retain the province in my analysis because my interest is in the enactment of 
prohibition laws. Quebec did enact such a law, though it never became effective. It was, at least 
partly, Quebec‘s Westminster version of democracy which allowed such rapid alteration and repeal.      
While only the difference between moderate and consensus democracies proves significant at the 95% 
level for a difference in mean duration, the comparison between the majoritarian and consensus 
democracies merits some consideration.
50
 Consistent with the theoretical argument outlined above, 
democracies with lower barriers to policy change both enacted and repealed prohibition earlier,
51
 with 
prohibition being in force for a shorter period in total. Of course, we can presume that strong barriers 
prevented some countries from enacting prohibition at all. This protection, however, needs to be 
weighed against the longer half-life of any illiberal policy which does come about. These two factors 
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 We should take these results with a good dose of salt, however. In addition to the small sample size, all of 
those classified as majoritarian democracies are the current provinces of Canada.  
51
 Though only the difference in year of repeal passes a t test for difference in mean.  
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are not entirely commensurable, and we need to recognise that structural constraints have both costs 
and benefits even when we take strictly negative liberty as our sole criterion of desirability.  
3.5. CONCLUSION  
The cursory and anecdotal case made here should be seen as only a first step in confirming the 
hypothesis that structural barriers increase the half-life of the bad policies caused by preference 
spikes. Further case-studies in the policy responses to preference spikes seem like the logical next 
step. The panic following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the subsequent 
overreaction in airport and other security measures will likely provide a useful case, since most 
countries have reacted with policy changes to some degree. This will require a more careful analysis 
than I have offered here, since the bad policy in this case is multifaceted and continuous, rather than a 
binary choice. Another possible test would be a cross-national comparison of the tendency Higgs 
(1987) identified for government spending to grow in times of crisis, before falling below the peak 
level and settle at a permanently higher steady state. If the hypothesis I have offered here is correct, 
and assuming that bad policy is reflected higher spending, we should expect the reversion to the 
steady state to be slower in more constrained democracies.  
If correct, my argument has several implications for constitutional robustness. First, barriers to 
policymaking have both costs and benefits even when taking a purely negative libertarian worldview. 
These costs and benefits are not entirely commensurable, and anyone in a position to make a choice 
between alternative institutions must make a holistic judgement on their merits.  
Second, constitutional constraints which require preferences to stay in place for longer periods of time 
will be more effective at protecting against panic policy. The successive majorities currently required 
to amend the constitution in some countries are an obvious example, though would also increase the 
duration of any bad policy which did pass this high threshold. Further, the delay required by 
successive majorities is likely to prompt many countries to ignore constitutional constraints altogether 
in a time of perceived urgency. A better option would be to require that all policies, or those within 
some constitutionally protected sphere, be subject to confirmation at some point after its original 
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enactment. This could either require the same majority to keep it in place as were originally required 
to enact it, or a weaker sunset clause requiring a simple majority or affirmation by the executive. This 
would put policies on an automatic trial period, with those without sustained levels of support being 
abandoned earlier than they would if the requirements for repeal were as strong as those for 
enactment.    
Finally, the structural features of constitutions which increase the effective supermajority requirement 
for policy change are not as robust to illiberal preference change as we might have thought. If highly 
popular views are likely to become even more popular, increasing the effective majority requirement 
will be less effective than the counterfactual world without availability cascades. This leads to the 
pessimistic conclusion that structural constitutional constraints are not very robust in times of crisis. 
The previous chapter showed that mere parchment barriers to illiberal policy can be fairly effective in 
times when liberty would otherwise be abrogated. In terms of availability cascades, this could be 
because the constitution provides the liberal policy with a rhetorical advantage over illiberal policy, or 
at least reduces its disadvantage. Together, these two chapters suggest that constitution writers should 
devote more time to bills of rights relative to structural constraints than we might have previously 
thought.  
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Chapter Four 
The Horrible Truth about Comparative Institutional Analysis  
4.1.  INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters have shown that analysis of institutional robustness is far from 
straightforward. It is impossible to declare one set of institutions more robust than another simpliciter. 
Rather, the social scientist intent on reaching normative conclusions must specify precisely what 
normatively relevant outcomes she is analysing, as well as the causally relevant factors expected to 
influence this outcome. Without a clear view of both the dependent and independent variables, robust 
political economy is vacuous.  
In this chapter I will go further, arguing that an algorithmic evaluation of alternative institutions or 
policies is simply impossible. While it is now commonly held that the economist cannot know an 
individual‘s preferences perfectly except by observing concrete choices, the idea of an underlying 
ordinal preference function is taken as axiomatic. I will argue that no such coherent set of preferences 
exists independently of choice. Rather than arguing against the possibility of a scientific welfare 
economics on epistemic grounds, as Austrian economists such as Mises (1949) Rothbard (1997a; 
1997b) have done, I will do so on logical grounds. This will provide a more thoroughgoing critique of 
welfare economics which cannot be countered by rejecting the Austrian ―praxeological‖ method of 
deduction.  
When making choices, people do not maximise utility or a pre-existing preference function but make 
context-dependent tradeoffs of incommensurable goods. A well-ordered ranking of alternatives in 
terms of preference or welfare does not exist prior to choice but is constructed by the act of choice 
itself. This view is inconsistent with rational choice theory as articulated by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1964) but remains consistent with folk conceptions of rationality as goal-directedness 
and responsiveness to reasons.  
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While a working assumption of a pre-existing preference function is a reasonable operational fiction 
for the positive economist, I will argue that attempts to normatively evaluate alternative institutions or 
policies on welfare grounds cannot proceed as if preferences exist apart from action. Instead of 
masking our value judgements as value-free science, social scientists must realise that normative 
conclusions can only be derived from moral reasoning and that moral questions can never have a 
decisive answer.  
4.2.  THE EPISTEMIC CASE AGAINST WELFARE ECONOMICS 
Economics has traditionally taken a utilitarian conception of value: the various goods individuals 
pursue give them a definite level of satisfaction which can be compared between individuals. Pigou's 
(1912) welfare economics, which provides the foundation for much policy-making and analysis today, 
is perhaps the most complete formulation of this approach. Pigou distinguished between private and 
external costs and benefits, insisting that each could be assigned a monetary value. The effect of 
smoke emitted from a factory on neighbours‘ health and happiness, for example, has a definite 
magnitude which can be compared, via the common denominator of willingness to pay, to ordinary 
marketable goods. While the epistemic problem of discovery might be difficult, the single metric of 
value makes policy evaluation conceptually straightforward.   
A number of positivist economists, most notably Pareto (1906), began to question the scientific 
validity of this utilitarian approach. The economist as scientific observer never sees individuals‘ 
utility directly but only their choices. The comparison of utilities between individuals becomes 
impossible (Robbins 1938), and we can never know whether any policy which benefits some at the 
expense of others will increase aggregate welfare. Pareto, taking a minimal welfarist normative 
foundation, argued that the economist can justly say that one policy is superior to another if and only 
if at least one individual is made better off (as judged by his own preferences) without any individual 
being made worse off. While the Pareto criterion is compelling, it does not allow the economist to say 
much about welfare. Every real-world choice between policies will harm some at the expense of 
others and there will be no grounds for choosing between them.   
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Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1939), and Scitovsky (1941) revived the largely ignored work of Pareto in 
order to allow positive economists to talk about welfare without making interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. While rejecting interpersonal comparisons of utility, they argued that potential Pareto 
improvements are welfare-improving. Policies which benefit some at the expense of others, and are 
therefore not Pareto improvements, are potential Pareto improvements if the winners could 
compensate the losers, thereby making everybody at least as well off as they were before, regardless 
of whether such compensation is actually made.  
Scholars such as Block (1977) have rightly questioned the morality of this approach, as well the 
empirical possibility of discovering whether a policy is a potential Pareto improvement, particularly 
when we take strategic falsification of costs and benefits into account (Stringham 2001). More 
fundamentally, though, the Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky approach retains the mistaken view that 
individual preferences exist independent of action.  
The Austrian school of economics has been the most sensitive to the full implications of the 
impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the most insistent that positive economics 
should deal with choice rather than utility or preference. Mises was quite clear that choice is prior to 
preference on epistemic grounds: the only way an external observer can claim that a person prefers an 
apple to an orange at a particular time is by observing their choice of an apple over an orange.  
When it comes to the actual logical relationship between preference and choice, however, it is rather 
less clear what precisely Mises thought. His notion of a ―value scale‖ seems to imply that there exists 
an ordinal preference function which underlies and gives rise to choice. While insisting that 
preferences had no cardinal magnitude and were therefore not amenable to arithmetic manipulation, 
his theoretical system endowed each individual with an ordinal ranking of all options from most to 
least desirable. This is, in effect, very close to the indifference curve understanding of preferences 
within contemporary neoclassical economics. While Mises insists that the value scale is a mere 
abstraction to make sense of choice, it is difficult to see how such a scale could be revealed through 
action. The notion of a value scale, as Barnett and Block (2009) point out, is inconsistent with his 
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principle of singularism – that we can only make one choice in any situation and therefore that we can 
only observe a preference for the chosen course of action over those foregone. While the relative 
orientation of any two goods on the value scale could potentially be revealed by choice, it is logically 
impossible to rank options more than two-deep. If we give an individual a choice between an apple, 
an orange, and a banana, his choice of an apple demonstrates that he prefers the apple to either the 
orange or the banana at that time under those circumstances. This allows us to say nothing about his 
relative valuation of the orange and banana, however, and offering him another choice creates an 
entirely distinct choice situation, allowing us to say something else about his preferences but not to 
combine this information into a grand scale revealed through multiple choices. This inconsistency 
leads one to suspect that Mises saw the value scale as logically prior to choice, even though the 
economist as scientist has to proceed as if the reverse were true.  
While a belief in unobservable value scales makes little practical difference in Mises‘s deductive 
Praxeology, it makes quite a difference to those who would take Misesian insights while engaging in 
non-deductive inference. If there really were some value scale underlying choice, the inductively-
inclined social scientist could, while remaining epistemically humble, attempt to approximate it. This 
approximation is bound to be imperfect but could nevertheless provide a useful guide to 
policymaking. I will argue that there is no such thing as a value-scale underlying choice and that 
preferences themselves are an abstraction derived from choice. Choice does not reveal individual 
preferences to external observers but creates a preference in the chooser himself.  
4.3.  THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 
4.3.1. The Context of Choice  
The decisions we actually reach when weighing competing values are determined by a number of 
factors, not all of which are deemed relevant by rational choice theory. The standard view of choice in 
economics – and one which is required if welfare economics is to make any sense – holds that 
individuals are able to ordinally rank preferences from most to least desirable and that these 
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preferences should not depend on normatively irrelevant contextual factors such as the framing of the 
question, method of elicitation, or mood at the time of choice (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1964). 
In reality, this does not seem to be the case. Emotions seem to play a significant role in decision-
making, and two central tenets of rational choice theory, preference transitivity and procedural 
invariance, seem to be invalidated by a large literature in psychology and behavioural economics 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1986: 253-254). Background moods can affect our decisions, as can seemingly 
irrelevant aspects of the problem frame.   
4.3.2. Emotion  
A number of studies have shown that emotions have a significant role to play in decision-making 
(Damasio 1994; Bechara et al 1994; Shiv & Fedorikhin 1999; Bechara et al 2000; Sanfey et al 2003; 
Loewenstein et al 2001; Loewenstein & Lerner 2003; Bechara 2004; De Martino et al 2006).  Our 
mood at the particular time of choice, for example, can affect the outcome of our deliberations. In 
some cases, this can be because we are facing a distinct choice: I might prefer beer to whiskey when 
feeling hot but whiskey to beer when feeling cold.
52
 The effect of mood on choices goes much deeper 
than this, however. Even decisions which only affect us at future times when we can be confident our 
fleeting emotional state has passed are shaped by our current mood (Deldin & Levin 1986; Forgas 
1989, 1991, 1995; Nygren et al 1996; Raghunathan & Pham 1999; Hockey et al 2000; Yuen & Lee 
2003).  
The effect of emotion on decision-making should not be seen as a perversion of rationality but as a 
crucial component of real-world choice. The ―somatic marker hypothesis‖ developed by Damasio 
(1994; Bechara & Damasio 2005) holds that human cognitive processes are by themselves incapable 
of producing wise decisions and that affective states contain information crucial for choice. Support 
for this hypothesis comes from both from numerous studies implicating emotional regions of the brain 
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 Such effects could be understood economically as changes in the budget constraint rather than the preference 
function. Environmental heat is a good we are forced to consume, and may exhibit complementarities with other 
goods we can choose to consume, such as beer. Hot weather changes the bundle of goods we have no choice but 
to consume, and so it would be rational, even with a stable and well-behaved preference function, to alter our 
consumption decisions accordingly. 
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in decision-making (Bechara et al 2000) and the fact that individuals with normal cognitive function 
but damage to emotional centres of the brain seem to choose poorly. In one case, a previously 
intelligent and well-adjusted individual, patient EVR, suffering from a brain tumour underwent 
surgery which removed part of his brain (the ventromedial frontal cortices) responsible for the 
processing of emotion (Eslinger & Damasio 1985; Damasio et al 1991). EVR retained a high level of 
cognitive intelligence following the surgery: with an IQ in the 130s, a good memory, and strong 
deductive and inductive reasoning ability. Despite this superior cognitive ability, EVR was incapable 
of operating in the real world following his surgery. By his own judgement, he began to make poor 
decisions and seemed incapable of setting priorities. He would fail to show up to his job, meaning that 
he could not hold one down, and would spend hours deliberating over choices of little consequence, 
such as what to wear or where to eat. The decisions he would eventually reach seemed random.  
The effect has been demonstrated experimentally, though only with hypothetical choice. Bechara et al 
(1994) presented subjects with injuries similar to those of EVR and a control group with a learning 
task. Subjects were asked to choose between four decks of cards which gave both monetary rewards 
and punishments and were told to maximise their total payoff. Two of these decks contained cards 
with both higher rewards and punishments, and a lower net value, than the other. Despite being 
cognitively normal in most respects, the emotion-impaired group were less able to uncover the 
optimal strategy of choosing the low-reward, low-punishment decks.  
If emotion does indeed play a significant positive role in choice, decision-making cannot proceed 
through calculative utility-maximisation, as implied by rational choice theory. Emotion is messy, 
indeterminate, and more sensitive to context than is computation. Emotionally-informed choice is 
unlikely to be algorithmic, and normatively-irrelevant environmental features are bound to influence 
the decision-making process (Bechara & Damasio 2005: 363-365).  
4.3.3. Elicitation Method 
The importance of context to choice is clearly demonstrated by the experimental literature around 
―preference reversals.‖ The most striking studies of this type involve the reversal of preferences 
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among subjects asked to make the same choice under different methods: pairwise choice and 
monetary valuation. Rational choice theory would predict that the preferred option would garner a 
higher willingness to pay, since the method of elicitation is irrelevant to choice. Experimental results, 
however, suggest that this is not the case (Lichtenstein & Slovic 1971, 1973; Lindman 1971; Grether 
& Plott 1979; Mowen & Gentry 1980; Pommerehne et al 1982; Reilly 1982).    
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) noted that choices between pairs of gambles were influenced more 
strongly by probabilities, while buying and selling prices for gambles were influenced more strongly 
by payoffs. They reasoned that it would possible to devise a pair of gambles for which the expressed 
monetary value would be higher for the least preferred gamble. This idea formed the basis of a well-
replicated experiment three years later (Lichtenstein & Slovic 1971).  
This study elicited both preference and willingness to pay for bets with a low probability but a high 
payoff (―$ bets‖) and a high probability but a low payoff (―P bets‖). One of these bet pairs, for 
example, involved a 9/12 chance to win $1.20 and 3/12 to lose $0.10 (the P bet), against 3/12 to win 
$9.20 and 9/12 to lose $2.00 (the $ bet). The subjects were given the choice between a $ bet and a P 
bet, with identical, or nearly so, expected value. Following this, subjects were told they held the right 
to play each of these gambles and were asked to name their minimum selling price, using the 
incentive-compatible revelation technique of Becker et al (1964). Three experiments were conducted. 
In the first two of these, all choices and valuations were hypothetical, with no gambles being played 
and subjects simply being paid an hourly rate to participate. While results of this sort may be 
indicative of human psychology, they cannot be considered decisive. Hypothetical choices are thought 
experiments and, lacking consequences, are not decisions in an economic sense. The third experiment, 
though, involved real payoffs and is therefore more interesting from an economic perspective. 
In this third experiment, fourteen male undergraduates were given six pairs of $ and P bets and asked 
to choose between them, with the same pairs being offered three times with options in varied order. 
The bets were to be run in points which were to be converted to cash at the end of the experiment, 
with possible winnings ranging from US$0.80 to US$8.00 – not inconsiderable for students in the 
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early 1970s. Subjects were then asked to state their selling price for each gamble. A clear majority of 
those choosing the P bet over the $ bet also gave the $ bet a higher monetary value: different methods 
of elicitation led to a reversed ranking of options.  
To explain these results, we need to abandon or seriously modify the standard model of rational 
choice theory. Rather than having a well-defined set of dispositional preferences which are 
demonstrated in action, every choice is a constructive act. Different elicitation methods will bring 
different aspects of the problem into focus and produce different results. In the experiments described 
above, it seems that the dollar valuation of the bets brought the potential win into focus, making the 
probability of winning a less salient aspect of the decision. The binary choice, on the other hand, 
seemed dominated by the probability of winning. The monetary valuation of bets likely involves an 
anchoring at the level of the win and an (insufficient when compared to the binary choice) downward 
adjustment based on the probability of that win.  
Understandably, a number of economists have sought to explain this result away as the result of 
insufficient monetary incentives or a failure to understand the problem on the part of subjects. The 
results have been replicated a number of times, however. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973) had similar 
results on the floor of a Las Vegas casino, and a number of economists attempting to refute the 
hypothesis have upped the monetary incentives and gone to great lengths to ensure subjects 
understood the choices they were making – sometimes requiring subjects to take tests and providing 
the expected values of each bet. Preference reversal remained common (Grether & Plott 1979; 
Pommerehne et al 1982; Reilly 1982).  
Other studies have claimed success in their attempts to undermine the results, though these either 
show a misunderstanding of the phenomenon, or limit the applicability of the results in ways which do 
not affect the argument presented here. Bohm (1994) attempted to replicate the conditions of previous 
experiments but in a more real-world context of the market for used cars. He bought two cheap cars to 
be auctioned off to students, with methods to elicit their willingness to pay and preference between 
the cars. One car was a reliable Volvo, which he reasoned was similar to the P bet, since it was not 
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able to provide a stunning driving experience but had a high probability of performing reasonably 
well. The other was the fancier but less reliable Opel, which represented the $ bet, since it would 
provide a more pleasant driving experience if things went well but was more likely to break down.  
Bohm found no preference reversals in his study and concluded that the relevance of prior studies is 
restricted to laboratory experiments. The fact that Bohm found no reversals is not surprising, since 
none of the potential payoffs of the cars were expressed in monetary terms. Preference reversal 
happens because people take the payoff as an anchor when deciding on their valuations, since the 
stimulus and response are measured in the same units, it will receive a greater weight in decision-
making. It is not the valuable payoff per se which leads to anchoring but a high payoff expressed in 
the same units as the required response. Evidence for scale compatibility as the driving factor in these 
preference reversals is provided by Tversky et al (1990). They show that preference reversals can 
occur due to scale compatibility in non-risky choices involving time preferences: subjects often 
preferred a lesser amount of money sooner but valued a higher amount later at a greater current 
monetary price.  
Bohm and Lind (1993) examine preference reversals in real-world lotteries, finding some reversals 
but a lower proportion than in earlier studies. Again, this does nothing to undermine the results of 
earlier studies. Earlier studies were designed to elicit preference reversals, not to show that reversals 
are common in the wild but to show unambiguously that anchoring-and-adjustment effects are going 
on behind the scenes in all such decisions. Not every choice between $ and p bets will produce 
reversals. The fact that situations can be constructed to elicit reversals tells us about the psychology of 
choice, not the general choices people will in fact make. The idea is not that every time a P bet is 
preferred to a $ bet, we should expect the $ bet to receive a higher monetary valuation. Rather, $ bets 
are more heavily influenced by the monetary payoffs and that there is a certain range of payoff-
probability space in which preferences will be reversed.  
Preference reversal also seems to happen without scale compatibility issues when bundles of goods 
are compared individually or jointly. Hsee (1996, 1998; Hsee et al 1999) finds that undergraduates 
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hypothetically prefer inferior bundles of goods of higher average quality when asked to evaluate 
individually but will choose the superior bundle of lower average quality when asked to choose 
between the two.
53
 List (2002) finds similar preference reversals in a field experiment at a sports card 
trading show. This involved real payoffs and a self-selected set of subjects who were actually 
interested in the goods being offered.  This study is thus less subject to the complaints of external 
validity. List offered potential buyers two bundles of cards; one containing ten high-quality cards, and 
one containing ten high-quality and three low-quality cards. Again, the superior set of lower average 
quality was consistently preferred in pairwise choice but garnered lower willingness to pay in dollar 
terms.  
The results described above should not necessarily lead us to expect rampant preference reversal in 
the wild. As Levitt and List (2007a, 2007b) argue, the environment of a laboratory experiments are 
quite different than those faced by humans in everyday life. To the extent that behaviour is elicited by 
the laboratory situation, experimental results are externally invalid. While this is undoubtedly true, it 
does not undermine the point I wish to make here. In fact, it strengthens it. Levitt and List stress the 
context of choice as an important factor in behaviour, which is also my point. Concerns about external 
validity should worry anyone wishing to use to the experiments described above to predict human 
behaviour. This is not what I wish to do. Even if we never saw this kind of preference reversal in the 
wild, the experiments still demonstrate that a well-ordered preference function does not exist 
independently of choice.  
Subjects were making genuine choices in contexts designed to exploit peculiarities in their decision-
making processes. This demonstration tells us something about the mechanisms underlying choice, 
rather than the choices people will actually make. I am here interested in the former. Showing that 
people do not have invariant preferences in this instance is enough to discredit a strict reading of 
rational choice theory.  
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 The bundles were two dinner sets; one with 24 high-quality pieces and one with 24 high-quality and 16 low-
quality pieces.  
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4.3.4. Framing  
Another factor deemed irrelevant by rational choice theory which seems to influence choice is the 
framing of problems (Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1986). Tversky and Kahneman (1981: 453) define 
a decision frame as ―the decision-maker‘s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice,‖ which is ―controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and 
partly by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker.‖ Choices which are 
identical from a logical point of view can be framed in distinct ways, prompting the decision-maker to 
think about the problem differently and producing preference reversals between different descriptions 
of the same choice.  
One type of such preference reversals can be explained by Kahneman and Tversky‘s (1979) prospect 
theory of decision-making under uncertainty. As an alternative to expected utility theory, prospect 
theory holds that risky choice involves two stages: editing and evaluation. Rather than considering the 
total effect on wellbeing, as in expected utility theory, the individual first frames the possible results 
of each option, applying values and weights, before evaluating the choice. Crucially, outcomes are 
understood as deviations from a neutral starting point, with positive and negative deviations treated 
differently. Kahneman and Tversky posit and S-shaped value-function which is convex below the 
starting point and concave above. This means that the difference in subjective value between two 
possibilities decreases as the absolute magnitude of the gain or loss pushes us away from the starting 
point: the difference between $1 and $2 is weighted more heavily than the difference between $11 and 
$12. This is true of both gains and losses, which makes people risk-averse with respect to gains but 
risk-loving with respect to losses. This is known as the reflection effect.  
This asymmetry can produce preference reversals when the neutral reference point is altered, as has 
been shown in a number of experiments. A large majority of these studies involve hypothetical 
questions without payoffs and should be taken with a good dose of salt, for the reasons detailed above. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981: 543), for example, asked subjects to imagine the outbreak of a deadly 
disease, expected to kill 600 people if no action is taken. Two responses were proposed, the framing 
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of which varied between groups. The first group were told that Program A would save 200 people 
with certainty, whereas Program B would save all 600 people with a probability of 1/3, and otherwise 
save nobody. The second group were instead told that if Program C were undertaken, 400 people 
would die with certainty, whereas Program D would result in no deaths with a probability of 1/3 and 
600 deaths with a probability of 2/3. These two groups were given the same logical problem, 
differently framed. When the question was framed in terms of lives saved, 72 percent of subjects 
preferred Program A, the risk-averse option. When framed in terms of number of deaths, 78 percent 
preferred Program D, the risk-seeking option.  
The extent to which these framing effects remain when people face monetary incentives is less certain 
than is the case with the elicitation method preference reversals described above. A few studies have 
found that monetary incentives do not remove the effects of positive/negative framing (Camerer 1989; 
Schoemaker 1990; Tversky & Kahneman 1992: 315-316; Kühberger et al 2002). Others, though, have 
found that they have reduced or disappeared (Laury and Holt 2005). Interestingly, Kühberger et al 
(2002) found that framing effects happen with real monetary incentives only when those incentives 
are non-trivial, reasoning that people almost always prefer to gamble with trivial amounts of money.  
The evidence for prospect theory more generally, which implies the possibility of preference reversals 
based on positive/negative framing, is quite strong. Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) find that risk 
preference is explicable from a prospect theory, rather than expected utility, perspective in the face of 
very strong incentives. By conducting their experiments with students in China, they were able to 
offer subjects a maximum payoff of three times their monthly income in a two-hour experiment. 
Camerer (2000) shows that prospect theory can explain a number of anomalies in financial, labour, 
and betting markets, though List (2004) shows that market experience can remove this effect. 
It seems, then, that prospect theory holds up in the real world, at least some of the time. Again, the 
argument presented here does not require that framing can consistently reverse the preferences of 
individuals in their daily lives. The fact that the framing of choice can prove decisive in some 
situations shows that it is always a potential factor.    
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4.3.5. Irrelevant Alternatives  
If we prefer X over Y when given a binary choice between them, rational choice theory tells us that 
we should continue to do so when a third option Z is introduced. The introduction of an extra 
alternative into a choice set can never increase the market share of another option under rational 
choice theory and will normally reduce it. This does not seem to always be true in reality. A number 
of studies have shown that irrelevant alternatives can have a significant influence on choice (Huber et 
al 1982; Huber & Puto 1983; Simonson 1989; Simonson & Tversky 1992; Tversky & Simonson 
1993; Mishra et al 1993; Heath & Chatterjee 1995; Herne 1999).  While most empirical evidence 
comes from hypothetical choice in the lab, the results have remained in the face of modest incentives 
(Simonson & Tversky 1992; Herne 1999) and there is anecdotal evidence from marketing that the 
effect holds in the field (Lynch et al 1991).   
Adding irrelevant alternatives can affect choice in a number of ways. The ―attraction effect,‖ first 
documented by Huber et al (1982), involves the introduction of a third asymmetrically dominated 
option into a binary choice increasing the desirability of the option by which it is dominated. For 
example, Simonson and Tversky (1992) offered subjects the choice between a high-quality and 
attractive pen and $6. When they also offered a clearly inferior pen, the number choosing the high-
quality pen over the cash significantly increased. Herne (1999) offered subjects the choice between 
gambles with identical expected values, which differed in terms of the amount and probability of 
payoff. The introduction of a third decoy option which was dominated by one but not the other of the 
original gambles – i.e. had either a lower payoff or probability without a compensating increase in the 
other attribute – significantly increased the proportion choosing the dominant alternative.  
Another finding has been that people tend to avoid the most extreme options in a choice set and will 
therefore be more likely to choose a particular item if a third option which is more extreme on all 
dimensions is added (Huber & Puto 1983). Possible explanations for this effect include loss aversion 
generalised to product attributes and the need to create a compelling justification for choice 
(Simonson 1989; Tversky & Simonson 1993). Simon and Tversky (1992) asked subjects to 
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hypothetically choose which camera they would prefer to buy at given prices. The first group were 
given the choice between a relatively low-cost, low-quality camera and a high-cost, high-quality 
camera. The second group were also given the option of a third camera, which was of even higher 
price and quality. The introduction of this third option increased the market share of the second 
camera, which seemed was a compromise between the extremes of the other two. Herne (1999) found 
only weak support for this effect when using real incentives. Of the five choice sets she offered 
subjects, all produced preference reversals in the expected direction, though only two of these were 
statistically significant.   
Like the other preference reversals discussed above, this is not consistent with rational choice theory. 
Clearly inferior alternatives should be ignored and have no influence on choice, and choice between 
two options should only be influenced by the attributes of those two options, not their position relative 
to other alternatives.  
4.4. THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE  
The phenomena described above show that context influences choice. The fact that preferences can be 
reversed by manipulating the normatively-irrelevant features of the decision-making environment 
implies that individuals have no context-invariant set of preferences on which they base their choices. 
The implications of this for economic theory are profound. As Grether and Plott (1979: 623) put it: 
Taken at face value the data are simply inconsistent with preference theory and have broad implications 
about research priorities within economics. The inconsistency is deeper than the mere lack of 
transitivity or even stochastic transitivity. It suggests that no optimization principles of any sort lie 
behind even the simplest of human choices and that the uniformities in human choice behavior which  
lie behind market behavior may result from principles which are of a completely different sort from 
those generally accepted. 
Choices do not simply reveal preferences but create them (Bettman et al 1998; Lichtenstein & Slovic 
2006). The data, not to mention introspection and casual observation, are not consistent with the 
rational choice view that we have a well-behaved set of preferences which we can consult whenever 
we face a choice. Rather, humans rely on a variety of decision-making strategies, each of which will 
often produce different results (Tarter & Hoy 1998). The decision-making tools we use in any 
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situation will depend on a great many contextual factors, many of which rational choice theory deems 
inadmissible. We are biochemical machines and operate differently in different conditions. 
This makes perfect sense from a biological point of view. Humans have evolved to produce behaviour 
and to make choices which maximise their reproductive success under resource constraints. The 
notion of bounded rationality (Simon 1955) tells us that rational decision-makers will not make fully 
rational decisions but will trade off rationality and decision-making costs. Similarly, even if it were 
possible for humans to have been equipped by evolution with well-behaved preference functions 
which would maximise reproductive success, the resource cost of such a design would have been 
prohibitive.  
There does not seem to be any reason for privileging any of our myriad decision strategies above 
others, declaring it the Real Us. Most choices involve genuine tradeoffs on which reasonable men can 
disagree. If we metaphorically treat alternate decision strategies as little men inside our heads, it 
seems that reasonable homunculi can also disagree. This implies that there is simply no fact of the 
matter as to what a person prefers until they are put into a situation of choice. It makes no sense to 
speak of dispositional preferences, since what an individual prefers depends on a great many factors 
outside the skull. Human decision-making is always embodied and occurs in a rich environment 
which can trigger alternative choice processes. While standard rational choice theory holds that 
preferences exist independently of the context of choice, choice in a different context is a 
fundamentally different choice.  
Of course, there are some things a person will reliably prefer under any realistic set of circumstances. 
With some exceptions, people will always choose pleasure over pain. Similarly, we might expect 
close to universal acceptance of an offer of a million dollars in exchange for enduring ten seconds of 
mild pain. This does not reduce the force of the central proposition that choice depends on context. 
These easy decisions still rely on context, though the conditions required to produce a different choice 
are extremely rare.  
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This theory of choice and preference seems highly counterintuitive at first. Given that humans 
imagine themselves as a unitary and indivisible Cartesian mind, a good deal of cognitive dissonance is 
bound to remain. Some elaboration on exactly what I am and am not saying might make the theory 
slightly more intuitive, however.  
Caplan (1999) argues against the Austrian position on preference by pointing to introspection. We can 
subjectively feel that we have preferences, even if there is no possibility of revealing that preference 
through action. Caplan‘s argument is correct but his use of the word ―preference‖ differs from my 
own and from mainstream Austrianism. Using Caplan‘s example, introspection can indeed tell him 
that he desires the subjective experience of ice cream and, should no other factors counteract this 
preference, that he prefers ice cream to its absence. What it does not tell us, though, is how much he 
wants ice cream relative to other things: how much money he would be willing to pay; how much 
pain he would be willing to endure; or how many statistical lives he would be willing to sacrifice in 
order to get an ice cream. Further, what he would be willing to give up would likely depend on the 
situation. If he were trying to minimise the calories he consumes, for example, he would have a 
genuine dilemma if offered an ice cream, and his choice might well depend on the rational-choice-
irrelevant context. Seeing the ice cream might make him more likely to indulge, or he could be 
influenced by his mood. Caplan can introspect his desires in a situation divorced from choice but not 
his preferences in the sense of an ordinal ranking of all available alternatives. He can reliably 
introspect the fact that he likes something and even that he would very likely prefer that thing over 
some other good. This is not enough to save rational choice theory, however, which requires that we 
are able to place all goods in a coherent ordering independent of normatively-irrelevant contextual 
factors.  
This rejection of rational choice theory does not imply that individuals are irrational, or even a-
rational. Humans act purposively and aim at ends which will please them. But there are many things a 
person will find pleasing, and which he chooses to pursue will depend on a number of factors 
unrelated to the choice problem itself. Nor do we need to give up the idea of utility maximisation as a 
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useful fiction in positive economics. Assuming stable and coherent preferences allows us to make a 
great many predictions regarding human behaviour which have proved useful (Friedman 1953). 
Further, we should expect experienced market actors to behave as if they have a well-behaved set of 
preferences. Ariely et al (2003) provide evidence that people will respond to marginal changes in 
prices in a way consistent with rational choice theory even though the original valuations are 
arbitrary. We should thus expect to see coherent demand curves but at levels determined in part by an 
arbitrary initial framing.  
When attempting to evaluate a policy or institution, however, the preferences and welfare of 
individuals are the very things we are interested in. If preferences and welfare are fundamentally 
different things from those posited by economic theory, any conclusions regarding them are likely to 
be nonsense. One cannot say anything interesting about an operational fiction.  
The above analysis implies a complete rejection of utility theory as the basis for normative 
economics. An alternative explanation, which would require a significant overhaul of utility theory 
but not its rejection, is that individuals have welfare functions but only come to learn them with 
experience in particular decision-making tasks (Plott 1996). While the coherence of choice does seem 
to increase with market experience (Hoeffler & Ariely 1999; List 2002; Ariely et al 2003; Carlson & 
Bond 2006; Amir & Levav 2008), it seems unlikely that this is due to the uncovering of a pre-existing 
utility function. List‘s (2002) trading card study discussed in section 4.3.3., for example, found fewer 
preference reversals among professional card traders than others. The fact that a significant number of 
reversals remained among those with a very high degree of market experience is difficult to square 
with the idea of experience unearthing a procedure-invariant utility function. Further, it is not entirely 
clear how this could be so given a pluralistic conception of value. If competing values have no neutral 
basis for comparison, in what sense does an overall preference function make sense?  
Given the tendency for preferences to solidify over time, though, it might be possible to take an 
―enlightened preference‖ view of welfare (Bartels 1996). Admitting that people make mistakes, we 
might extrapolate from the improvements in coherence with experience and posit a true welfare 
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function towards which revealed preferences gravitate. Indeed, it does seem reasonable to say that the 
performance of decision-makers improves as they gain experience. Preferences less dependent on 
normatively-irrelevant context make the decision-maker less susceptible to long-term losses due to the 
―money-pump‖ effect of preference intransitivity, for example.  The relative coherence of preferences 
among experienced market actors, though, is entirely consistent with context-dependent arbitrariness. 
Ariely et al (2003) show that preferences will tend to consolidate with experience but still depend on 
initial anchors which should be irrelevant to choice.    
Even if experience did completely remove the influence of context of choice, it would be unclear 
whether this would represent the discovery of a pre-existing utility function or the construction of a 
coherent one. Weber and Johnson (2006) argue that preferences are often constructed from memory, 
with past experiences and choices leading to a solidification of preferences over time. Similarly, the 
somatic marker literature discussed in section 4.3.2. suggests that the emotional cues which inform 
choice will become stronger as a stimulus is repeatedly encountered, leading to increasingly stable 
preferences.  
4.5.  IMPLICATIONS FOR WELFARE ECONOMICS 
While many have accepted the results of these studies and their implications for positive economic 
theory, there has been a lack of appreciation of the full normative impact of constructed preferences. 
While the problems posed to contingent valuation, which are of an epistemic nature, have been 
thoroughly discussed (Gregory et al 1993; Irwin et al 1993; Kahneman et al 1999; Hsee & 
Rottenstreich 2004), the implications for normative economics generally are profound.  
Many psychologists and behavioural economists will, in light of findings such as those described 
above, conclude that humans do not know what they want and are therefore irrational. Schumpeter‘s 
(1954: 1058) claim that rational choice theory provides a useful normative model of choice but an 
inadequate account of human psychology is often favourably quoted, and the conclusion is made that 
people should aim at maximising welfare but fail to do so in reality. This is clearly the case in Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler‘s work on ―libertarian paternalism‖ (Sunstein & Thaler 2003; Thaler & 
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Sunstein 2003, 2008). They argue that individuals‘ preferences are often ill-defined and malleable by 
the context of choice and that therefore benevolent ―choice architects‖ should shape the context in 
order to encourage people to make the right choices. This is based on a fundamentally mistaken view 
of preference and welfare. Thaler and Sunstein are quite willing to give up a well-behaved preference 
function logically prior to choice but wish to retain an equally abstract welfare function. This position 
requires an ethical monism which, I will argue, is entirely indefensible. If individuals do not have a 
unique preference function, neither do they have a unique welfare function.   
If value were unidimensional, preference reversal would straightforwardly show that humans are 
irrational in certain predictable contexts. If it were best for all people that they maximised physical 
pleasure (which would presumably need to be defined biochemically) with rates of time and risk 
preference constant across individuals, for example, it would be theoretically possible to identify the 
optimal choice for any individual and declare all others inferior. Of course, this is simply not a good 
description of the normative universe. Humans value many things – pleasure, self-actualisation, and 
excitement, for example – and these will normally be incommensurable (Berlin 1969, 1991; Galston 
2002, 2005; Raz 1997; Chang 1997). Even most hedonists do not have a moral theory adequately 
simple to attribute a unique and well-behaved welfare function to each individual. Adding variable 
risk and time preference to physical pleasure is enough to complicate matters sufficiently to thwart the 
impartial judgement of individual welfare.   
We routinely experience situations in which we must trade off one value for another. We face choices 
between career and family; short-term pleasure and long-term health; virtue and wealth. None of these 
cases involve a maximisation problem, as monists are bound to say they do, but the trading off of 
distinct values with no natural basis for comparison. The difficulty of such choices does not derive 
from their calculative complexity, as a difficult financial decision might, but from the indeterminacy 
of the problem.  
Not only, as Grether and Plott (1979: 623) argue, are there ―no optimization principles of any sort ... 
behind even the simplest of human choices.‖ Such optimisation would be impossible, since there is 
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nothing for us to optimise. Self-actualisation, comfort, pleasure, excitement, and a sense of 
community have no common denominator or exchange rate. When we make tradeoffs among these 
goods, we are not maximising the higher-order good of utility. Rather, we are pursuing our various 
and conflicting goals in ways of which we approve, with the level of approval depending on the 
environment in which we make our choice. Utility maximisation does not deserve even the 
aspirational value Schumpeter attributes it, since ought implies can and humans simply have no utility 
function to maximise. Utility theory, then, cannot provide the normative basis for welfare economics. 
It is difficult to overstate the implications of this view for normative policy analysis and comparative 
institutional analysis.  
The implications can be clearly seen when we consider cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA, which is a 
crucial part of policy analysis as it is practised today, involves reducing all costs and benefits of some 
particular action or policy to dollar values based on the subjective valuation of individuals. A cost-
benefit analysis might be conducted on whether to allow a factory to open in a small town, for 
example. This factory will presumably impose both costs and benefits on local residents. The smoke 
emitted from a factory could harm neighbours by preventing them from hanging washing outside and 
making their environment generally less pleasant, but the increased employment in the region might 
increase material standards of living. A CBA would estimate how much neighbours would be willing 
to pay (or accept) to avoid smoke from the factory. This would be placed on the cost side of a ledger, 
to be balanced against any offsetting benefits. When all benefits and costs have been estimated, the 
moral question reduces to simple arithmetic. Of course, CBA practitioners are often aware of the 
epistemic problems of estimating willingness to pay in the absence of market transactions but are 
generally content to state that a rough estimate of cost and benefit is better than no estimate at all. The 
argument of this chapter, however, suggests that costs and benefits have no definite magnitude when 
abstracted from choice. Estimating an nonexistent quantity is, of course, impossible.  
This is not to say that normative analysis cannot be performed rigorously using the insights of positive 
economic theory. We can reasonably argue about how much weight various interests should be given 
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in public policy. What we cannot do is to reduce all such interests to a single metric and come up with 
one correct answer to normative questions involving competing values. Reaching hard conclusions 
about normative questions masks numerous value judgements as value-free science.  
While many economists do recognise that value judgements are an inescapable part of welfare 
economics, attempts to make these judgements transparent while retaining the core methodology of 
welfare economics are generally unhelpful.  Following Samuelson (1947) and Bergson (1938), many 
specify a particular social welfare function, admitting that others can be equally valid, and use 
positive economics to discover which policies will maximise this welfare function. Effectively, this 
approach involves importing independently-derived normative premises into positive economic 
arguments. The problem with this approach is that the number of plausible social welfare functions is 
unbounded and depends on the framing and symbolic value of each outcome. It is certainly possible 
for an individual to state their values explicitly and perform a positive analysis which spits out an 
optimum course of action given those values, but it is unclear why anyone else should listen to him.  
Rather than importing normative conclusions into positive analysis, a better approach would be to 
import positive conclusions into normative arguments. It is far easier to reach a defensible position on 
how the world works than it is to agree on a common set of values, especially in the presence of 
constructed preferences. There is simply no neutral basis for deciding between competing values, and 
any attempt to provide a correct answer to moral problems is failing to engage with the normative 
richness of the world.  
The implications for robust political economy and comparative institutional analysis should be clear: 
not only is the normative evaluation of alternative institutional arrangements extremely complicated 
but also significantly subjective and open to disagreement. What we consider the worst case depends 
on our values and the context in which we consider the alternatives.    
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4.6.  CONCLUSION 
The rational choice view of human decision-making is empirically and theoretically indefensible. The 
social scientist‘s tendency to treat choice situations as reducible to simple optimisation problems leads 
to a false sense of normative tractability. In fact, humans pursue multiple goals simultaneously, and 
the priority of these goals can vary based on countless contextual factors.  
This does not tell us that humans are irrational or that liberty is not of instrumental value in the 
satisfaction of preferences. While the case for freedom of choice is often made on utilitarian grounds, 
other justifications are possible. We still strive to fulfil our plans and desires, albeit without a unique 
optimum in mind, and our own choices are likely to produce results more satisfying to us than are the 
choices of others. Further, the ability to freely choose our actions is itself valued by people. We resent 
control and will seldom be happy unless left to make our own choices (Mill 1859; Veenhoven 2003). 
The act of choice also seems to increase the perceived desirability of the chosen option (Mather et al 
2000, 2003), meaning that the frustration of choice will lead to less satisfaction even when our 
homunculi disagree on the best course of action. The consequentialist case for freedom can stand 
without a context-independent preference function; the utilitarian approach to normative institutional 
analysis cannot.  
A typical comparison of two institutions will specify some basis for normative evaluation, perform a 
positive analysis, and declare one institution the winner. This is satisfying: everybody likes certainty, 
and nobody likes a fence-sitter. The horrible truth about comparative institutional analysis, though, is 
that definitive answers are impossible. Many things are valuable, and any attempt to reduce them to a 
single good is bound to be arbitrary. Individuals always make their choices while embedded in a rich 
environment. This environment influences our choices, and preferences never exist in a vacuum.  
Those wishing to compare institutions must deal with this uncomfortable fact and attempt to evaluate 
outcomes non-algorithmically. If there were a genuine tradeoff between liberty and security, this 
could not be reduced through value-free science to a simple maximisation problem. Different people 
have different values and the robust political economist can thus never specify the worst case once-
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and-for-all. While simplifying assumptions which do not reflect the richness of the real world are 
valuable aids to our understanding, they become problematic when we are trying to evaluate two real-
world institutional alternatives. Social science can only ever be the first step in the evaluation of any 
institution or policy. The conclusions of social science, with recognition of its fallibility, must form 
the premises of moral arguments about policy. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion  
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
The chapters of this thesis, along with Crampton and Farrant (2006, 2008) and Taylor and Crampton 
(2009), have shown that a robust political economy and normative social science more generally is 
complicated and indeterminate. We need to consider a myriad of factors, as well as the interactions 
and feedback loops among them, while admitting that institutional alternatives will often be 
normatively ambiguous.  
Crampton and Farrant (2006, 2008) show that we need to consider the interactions between 
independent variables when conducting robustness analysis. While planner ignorance and self-interest 
are both undesirable in isolation, self-interested rulers become less harmful as ignorance increases.  
Taylor and Crampton (2009) show that even when considering what seems at first to be a single 
dependent and single independent variable, the specifics of the independent variable can have a huge 
effect on the results. Analysing the effect of meddlesome preferences on the negative freedom 
enjoyed by individuals under market anarchy and democracy, they show that neither can be said to be 
more robust to meddlesome preferences than the other. Rather, widely-held meddlesome preferences 
are more harmful under democracy, while concentrated meddlesome preferences are more harmful 
under anarchy.  
Chapter two, which dealt with the effect of enumerated constitutional rights, showed that deviations 
from ideal conditions need not lead to linear degradations in the outcome of interest. The 
constitutional prohibition of censorship seemed to have little effect when conditions were relatively 
good, offering protection of freedom of the press only past some threshold of general illiberalism.  
Chapter three offers an example of the tradeoffs involved in institutional choice. While structural 
barriers to policy change which increase the size of the minimum winning coalition clearly protect 
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liberty in some instances by reducing the chance that a zealous majority will be able to force its views 
on a minority, they will also tend to protract periods of bad policy which often accompany a crisis. 
Chapter four showed that these tradeoffs cannot, even in principle, be made scientifically on welfarist 
grounds. To speak of preferences and utility in the abstract is nonsensical, since the competition 
between mutually exclusive values can only be adjudicated by real, embodied people existing in a real 
environment which is never entirely orderly.    
While Hayek, Brennan and Buchanan, Levy, and the other founders of robust political economy have 
given us a powerful tool to evaluate political institutions, the standard approach requires complication 
in order to prove as useful as possible. I have already suggested that we need to consider multiple 
dependent and independent variables, and even then we are not justified in declaring the normative 
Truth. In this conclusion, I will use the results of the preceding chapter to suggest that we also need to 
evaluate alternative institutions under multiple states of the world. Brennan and Buchanan‘s analysis 
of quasi-risk aversion seems to imply that one appropriate set of assumptions regarding the state of 
the world exists for institutional choice, which can be discovered by considering the degree of 
convexity as well as the empirical likelihood of various states of the world. 
Given that political questions cannot be answered conclusively and require the consideration of 
multiple perspectives, policy analysis must be a social process. The interests of various groups need to 
be considered, and a compromise among competing values needs to be reached. This requires 
institutions which encourage dialogue, debate, and negotiation. The institution of large-scale 
democracy is not suited to this task, since it is dominated by expressive voting and symbolic 
signalling. Genuine deliberative policy-making would be advanced by decentralizing decision-making 
power to the smallest feasible political unit.  
5.2.  MULTIPLE ASSUMPTIONS  
There are three broad reasons that the robust political economist needs to consider multiple states of 
the world when evaluating institutions or policies: the empirically most likely state of the world is 
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seldom certain; the world can change in ways which void prior analyses; and reasonable people can 
disagree on what constitutes the worst case.  
5.2.1. Uncertainty  
Social-scientific analysis will often produce incorrect conclusions, even when based on sound 
principles of reasoning. Economic theory told us that lighthouses could not be produced privately, 
whereas Ronald Coase (1974) showed that they had been in reality.
54
 The problem is not simply that 
the economic theory which produced this conclusion was mistaken but that the constructivist social 
scientist can never foresee all the creative solutions ecologically rational agents can devise in order to 
solve social problems. Theory is no substitute for social experimentation (Hayek 1973; Smith 2003, 
2008).  
Society is a complex system in which the interaction of individuals with diverse goals and capacities 
produce an emergent result no participant intends nor fully understands (Hayek 1945; Schelling 
1978). Subtle changes at the individual level can have profound impacts at the social level, and there 
will often be significant uncertainty as to which model of the world actually reflects reality. If there 
are multiple possibilities, it would be sensible to consider alternative institutions under each set of 
assumptions and make a holistic evaluation of their merits. Many of the assumptions we should be 
thinking about are multifaceted and subject to Knightian uncertainty (Knight 1921), making it 
impossible to come up with any sort of weighted average of harm as Brennan and Buchanan do with 
respect to the knavishness of the monopolist.  
More fundamentally, the available data will always allow multiple interpretations of reality (Hume 
1748: Section 4; Duhem 1954; Quine 1951, 1975). Given the unbounded nature of theoretical 
possibility-space, every theory will be empirically equivalent to, but logically inconsistent with, 
another (Quine 1975). Further, empirical tests can never be performed on a single hypothesis, since it 
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 Some have questioned Coase‘s analysis, however. Van Zandt (1993) and Bertrand (2006) argue that 
government did in fact play a significant role in lighthouse provision. A number of other goods for which 
private provision would be deemed impossible by public goods theory seem to have been produced by markets, 
however, including radio and television broadcasts (Holcombe 2000:277-279), policing, highways (Benson 
1994), and prisons (D‘Amico, forthcoming).  
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is the entire theoretical edifice which jointly makes observational predictions. As such, adverse 
observations can always be made consistent with any hypothesis by modifying surrounding 
hypotheses (Duhem 1954). This uncertainty and holism makes scientific knowledge much less certain 
and suggests that the robust political economist should evaluate institutions under multiple states of 
the world whenever a high degree of uncertainty can be expected. The sheer complexity of social 
interaction makes the limits of human knowledge particularly pronounced in the social realm (Hayek 
1952).  
5.2.2. Change 
Closely related to the problem of uncertainty is that of change. Even if we are confident that our 
positive analysis is correct presently, the world can change in ways which void our prior analyses. 
Societies, economies, and cultures evolve over time in directions often unpredictable and path-
dependent (North 1990, 2005; Nelson & Winter 1982; David 1985; Arthur 1989; Pierson 2000).  
The outcome of arguments over whether voluntary institutions or government will best provide a 
particular service, for example, often depend on the current state of technology. The essays in 
Foldvary and Klein (2003) demonstrate that in several policy areas, technology has undermined 
previous policy rationales: RFID technology allows us to operate toll booths on roads more 
conveniently, bolstering the case for privatisation; information technology undermines the 
informational case for safety regulation; and the advertising-avoidance technologies of the internet 
and TiVo go some way towards undermining the solution broadcasters found to the non-excludability 
problem.    
Given that institutions, and especially constitutional rules, are meant to last for long periods of time, it 
would be wise for political economists to consider the possibility that the world will change in 
relevant ways and factor this into their policy recommendations.  
 
 
100 
 
5.2.3. What is the Worst Case?  
The pioneers of robust political economy treat the worst-case set of assumptions as visible at first 
glance. While it is unreasonable to expect early expositional analyses to lay out the processes of a new 
approach in full, this is something we need to do if we are to make practical use of robust political 
economy for institutional choice. If the worst case is to be judged in terms of outcomes, it will often 
not be obvious which case is, in fact, the worst until we perform the analysis. Should we be more 
fearful of knaves or misguided altruists? Brennan and Buchanan (1983: 103-104) point out that the 
zealot is more fearsome than the knave, but both zealotry and knavery come in multiple flavours.  
Which case really is the worst is seldom obvious and will likely depend on the particular institution 
we are considering (Taylor & Crampton 2009). If we take the now well-accepted public choice view 
that people behave more rationally and seek more information in the marketplace than in the voting 
booth, it is plausible that self-interest will be preferable to altruism in situations of democratic 
totalism, while altruism will be preferable to self-interest in a liberal market society. If this is so, there 
is no single worst case set of assumptions relevant to both institutions. Further complicating matters is 
the fact that we need to consider the interactions among independent variables. The normative 
implications of certain factors can be altered or reversed when other factors are in play (Crampton & 
Farrant 2006, 2008). 
Even after overcoming these problems of complexity, the problem of value pluralism remains. There 
are many possible dystopias and the subjective weight we put on various values will determine which 
is worse. This means that any serious robustness analysis will likely have to consider multiple cases as 
plausible candidates for the worst.  
5.2.4. Implications 
To deal with the limits of human knowledge, the dynamic nature of the world, and the slipperiness of 
normative judgement, comparative institutional analysis needs to become more complicated. Instead 
of choosing a single metric of goodness, a single factor which can affect that metric, and a single 
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model of how the world works, we need to admit that there are multiple dependent and independent 
variables and models of the world which deserve our attention. The weight we put on each of these 
variables and models depends on a number of factors, many of which are subject to reasonable 
disagreement. As such, no scientific answer can be reached on normative questions. Social science 
cannot simply turn the crank of objective analysis and produce an evaluation of the best set of 
institutions.  
5.3.  NON-ALGORITHMIC INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS  
My advice for those undertaking comparative institutional analysis is similar to Brennan and 
Buchanan‘s in its rejection of the best empirical guess at how the world works as the sole basis for 
normative evaluation. It differs from standard robust political economy, however, by suggesting that 
institutions should be evaluated not under any single assumed state of the world but under multiple 
sets of assumptions. It also differs in its normative view of institutional outcomes: instead of taking a 
simple view of social welfare as a single metric, it takes a ‗vector‘ view of desirability (Sen 1980). 
This will necessarily make comparative institutional more complicated and less deterministic: 
institutional analysis will seldom produce one obviously correct answer. It will, though, provide a 
richer framework for considering the unavoidable tradeoffs of institutional choice.  
We cannot simply say that one institution is more robust than another but must formulate causal 
hypotheses under certain assumptions which can then be considered from a moral point of view. 
Comparative institutional analysis, then, can only say things like ―the value V is more robust to 
change X in state of the world T under institution A than under institution B, given theoretical 
assumptions P.‖  
This is obviously more difficult than saying ―institution A is more robust than institution B,‖ but 
coming to terms with the complexity of the social world, the uncertainty of our understandings of it, 
and the heterogeneity of moral judgement is an inherently difficult undertaking. We should make our 
analyses as simple as possible but no simpler. The standard approach to normative social science has 
been so simple as to rule out the possibility of compelling answers. Making such restricted statements 
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never allows the social scientist, qua social scientist, to make a final judgement as to institutional 
desirability, no matter how many such statements we formulate. Instead, as is argued in chapter four, 
such statements need to form the premises of moral arguments.  
Moral arguments are never likely to produce hard conclusions. Any conclusions reached must be 
subject to revision and cannot be based on the false authority of value-free science. Since every 
individual comes with their own idiosyncratic moral intuitions and commitments, institutional 
evaluation must be a social process. If people were responsive to reasons and willing to compromise, 
there would be hope for an acceptable synthesis of competing values and agreement on which 
institutions are most reasonable.  
5.4.  NON-ALGORITHMIC INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 
The above discussion asks how we should evaluate alternative institutions or policies if we wish to 
give well-reasoned advice. The question of whether such a process will ever be used to inform policy-
making is entirely separate.  Political economists can engage in such policy analysis until they are 
blue in the face, with politicians ignoring their advice and carrying on with business as usual. The 
advice of cost-benefit analysis is today routinely ignored when it conflicts with pre-existing political 
goals, despite the fact that it is widely accepted.  
If my advice for policy analysts is to be used as a basis for policymaking, it would require some sort 
of deliberative democracy (Bessette 1980; Elster 1998). This, of course, requires truth-seekers willing 
to obey the rules of public reason (Kant 1784; Rawls 2005), which brings us to a second-order 
robustness problem: my proposed procedure for institutional analysis will only work to produce 
reasonable policy if political actors behave reasonably.
55
 There is good reason to think this will not be 
the case in the large-scale nation states which dominate the political landscape today. Voters in large 
polities do not have an incentive to think rationally about policy and will use politics as a means of 
expressing themselves, signalling loyalty, and promoting their own vision of the good life (Gusfield 
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 Of course, it is not clear whether it would do any worse on this count than the status quo.  
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1963; Edelman 1964, 1971; Brennan & Lomasky 1993; Caplan 2007).  Further, the group dynamics 
discussed in chapter three imply that deliberative democracy is likely to promote groupthink and 
extremism (Sunstein 2000).  
It is unclear, however, how we can improve this state of affairs in large-scale democracies. We are 
bound to be stuck with the problems of expressive politics, regardless of the procedures for 
institutional analysis we propose. Indeed, the procedures by which decisions are reached emerge from 
political institutions, and we therefore need to think about what institutions promote reasonableness in 
debate and a willingness to compromise. In Fung‘s (2002) words, we need institutions which create 
capable deliberative publics. A capable deliberative public is a public good: a well-adjusted polity will 
benefit everyone, regardless of whether they contribute to it. This is clearly not a public good which 
can be provided by central government, however, since it is impossible to extract resources from the 
masses to pay for its production. If there is hope for deliberative democracy, it lies with small-scale 
community governance.   
The Bloomington school of political economy has shown that when left to voluntarily cooperate, 
individuals in small groups will strive to produce creative solutions to collective action problems 
(Aligica & Boettke 2009). Ostrom (1990) shows that the problem of overuse of common pool 
resources can often be solved through non-state, non-market governance mechanisms which rely on 
trust, reciprocity, and compromise. The conclusion of economic science regarding the ―tragedy of the 
commons‖ (Hardin 1968) that common pool resources need to be either regulated by government or 
privatised turns out to be empirically false. Not only are voluntary solutions to such collective action 
problems possible, they turn out to perform more effectively than central control. Taking the case of 
irrigation networks in Nepal, for example, it seems that farmers managing production and access 
among themselves have more water available, enjoy higher levels of land productivity, and keep the 
irrigation system in better physical condition (Lam 1998; Joshi et al 2000).  
This should not be surprising. Humans evolved to interact in small groups, and cooperation on the 
scale of the modern state is entirely alien to human sensibilities. Cooperation at a community level 
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occurs among people with shared norms, a group identity, and a history of past interaction. A number 
of laboratory experiments have shown that cooperation in collective action problems is more likely 
when subjects interact face-to-face (Ostrom 1998), have previously interacted (Oskamp & Perlman 
1965), and perceive themselves as a group (Dawes et al 1988). The creation of a capable deliberative 
public involves a collective action problem likely to be solved more effectively through community-
level governance.  
The concrete rules which govern such systems are highly diverse – sometimes relying on formal 
punishments, other times on reputation and informal monitoring (Ostrom 2005). The important point 
is that they have developed from the ground up in ways sensitive to local constraints and 
opportunities. Small groups in which each participant has a significant, long-term stake in outcomes 
are more likely to reach reasonable decisions than central bureaucracies elected by large groups with 
nothing riding on their expressed wishes. It often becomes unclear whether cooperative groups should 
be thought of as governments or voluntary institutions. Home-owners‘ associations, for example, 
approximate many features of local governments. The distinction between government and civil 
society is not clear-cut at a local level and is in any case rather irrelevant (Nelson 2005).  
Not all collective action problems can be solved at a local level, however. When externalities reach 
far and wide, community governance will not be effective. It is clear that community regimes can do 
nothing about climate change, for example. This leads to another important contribution of the 
Bloomington school: polycentric governance (Ostrom et al 1961; McGinnis 1999).
56
 Whereas a 
monocentric system of governance involves one centre of power, which may or may not delegate 
certain responsibilities to lower level, polycentric systems involve many centres of power. This differs 
from simple jurisdictional competition as envisaged by Tiebout (1956) in that jurisdictions will 
depend on the services being produced and will normally overlap. Ostrom and Ostrom (1999) insist 
that decision-making power to solve a collective action problem must be vested as closely as possible 
with the group which stands to gain from its solution; the ―production unit‖ must match the 
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 Frey and Eichenberger (1996) develop a similar model of governance.  
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―collective consumption unit.‖ The consumption of national defence and clean streets, for example, 
occur at very different levels, and it makes little sense to have decisions made about them at the same 
level of governance.  
If people are able to pick and choose among competing governance service-providers, they will tend 
to settle on those which best meet their needs. When small-scale governance is possible, it will tend to 
flourish. In addition to directly augmenting the power of voice by decreasing the size of the decision-
making unit, thereby increasing incentives and decreasing transaction costs, the power of exit may 
lead to an indirect increase in voice. When decision-makers face the possibility of having customers 
or citizens leave, they face the incentive to take their wishes seriously and attempt a compromise 
between competing interests. Supporting this view, Mintrom (2003) finds that charter schools in 
Michigan, which are subject to market competition, give a greater voice to parents than do public 
schools.  
While polycentric governance is not capable of solving collective action problems perfectly, and in 
any case will only offer improvements to those goods for which the collective consumption unit is 
smaller than the current production unit, it does have the potential to increase meaningful dialogue 
and compromise. Breaking down the boundaries of existing polities would allow experimentation and 
create a market for governance. This would provide incentives for the creation of institutions which 
solve the problems of expressive politics and replace political conflict with meaningful conflict 
resolution.
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5.5.  CONCLUSION 
The central theme of this thesis has been that we, as political economists, need to give up our 
convenient illusions. Broadly speaking, these illusions can be divided into those of certainty and of 
security.  
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 Of course, I cannot say that such an approach is better in any scientific sense, since there are certainly 
arguments pointing in the other direction. I am merely making an argument which must be weighed along with 
all others.    
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Our simplistic moral theories and pretence of scientific certainty have given us an illusion of 
certainty. Harry Truman‘s impassioned plea for a one-handed economist fits the human desire for 
clear and simple answers but conflicts with the way the world works. Our positive conclusions are 
always subject to revision, and no normative implications ever emerge from political economy 
without the injection of subjective moral judgements.  
The tendency for economists and policy analysts to present normative conclusions as scientifically-
discovered fact is not surprising. Such misleading appeals to authority suit the political needs of 
policymakers, and the one-handed economist is likely to garner more public attention. A complete 
analysis of any public policy or institution, however, would require an infinite number of hands. Since 
no such analysis can ever be made, we need to rely on the social aspect of science to improve public 
decision-making, while admitting that such improvement is not a process of optimization.  
We also need to abandon our illusion of security. Buchanan and other constitutionalists tend to see 
constitutions as binding rules which constrain governors absolutely. This is clearly not the case and 
leads to a false sense of security. Perhaps the most transparent example of this tendency comes from 
followers of Ayn Rand, whose insistence on the need for government to enforce ―objective law‖ is 
wildly utopian (Binswanger 1992). While criticising anarchy as inevitably leading to gang warfare, 
they hope for a government which will enforce only just laws aimed at protecting individual liberty. 
Public choice theory tells us that this is not how any government is likely to behave, and the 
objectivists offer no means of constraining government other than the glittering generalities of 
constitutionalism.  
While the objectivists might turn out to be correct that anarchy will descend into violence, it is also 
true that government can follow a similar trajectory. As Demsetz (1969) so eloquently tells us, we 
need to avoid idealising any institution and treat all on an equal basis. Robust political economy 
cannot guarantee that things will not get really bad, since it is unlikely that any institution will be 
robust to extremely unfavourable conditions. Both anarchy and democracy could lead to the 
emergence of a highly predatory de facto state, for example. Cowen and Sutter‘s (2005) vision of 
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cartelization in anarchy might turn out to be true, but it is not clear whether such a situation is any 
worse than despotic governments emerging from democracies, such as Robert Mugabe‘s Zimbabwe. 
When informal institutions are poor, neither anarchy nor democracy is likely to produce a tolerable 
standard of life (Leeson 2007; Powell et al 2008). There is no way of avoiding the worst case with 
certainty. Further, in the very worst case institutions might not matter at all, since rules will often 
break down in times of emergency.  
A robust institution should not simply be seen as one which avoids the worst possible outcomes but 
one which performs well in a variety of conditions, as well as under a variety of normative stances 
and descriptive theories of the world. Assessing robustness can never be an algorithmic process but 
must involve a holistic judgment of costs and benefits. Analysis of this sort will not be easy but is the 
only way of truly facing the complexity of the real world.  
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Appendix One 
Description of Variables for Chapter Two 
Dataset at: http://bradtaylor.me/sites/default/files/bradtaylor.me/Taylor2009dataset.csv 
countryname Name of country.  
rsfindex 2008 Reporters Without Borders index of press freedom. (0-100; lower values indicate more 
freedom) 
rsf_10 rsfindex broken into ten categories. (An rsfindex value between 0 and 10 is coded as 0; 
between 10 and 20 as 1, etc.)  
rsf_20 rsfindex broken into twenty categories. (An rsfindex value between 0 and 5 is coded as 0; 
between 5 and 10 as 1, etc.)  
rsf_round2 rsfindex rounded to nearest even number.  
censor Does the constitution prohibit censorship. (0=no, 1=qualified; 2=absolue or qualified only by 
recourse for defamation) Based on content analysis of national constitutions.  
press Does the constitution protect freedom of the press (0=no, 1=qualified; 2=absolue) Based on 
content analysis of national constitutions.   
electoral The Economist Intelligence Units Democracy Index electoral process subscore (0-10; 10 
most democratic) http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf 
gdp CIA world factbook. PPP in 2008 US$, 2008 estimate 
year_const Year of constitutional ratification according to CIA World Factbook. 
age_const age of constitution (2008-yearconstitution – i.e. ignores month) 
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fh_electoral Freedom House (2008) electoral process subscore. (0-16; higher indicates more freedom, 
etc) 
fh_plural Freedom House (2008) Political Pluralism and Participation subscore. (0-16; higher 
indicates more freedom, etc) 
fh_function Freedom House (2008) functioning of government subscore. (0-16; higher indicates 
more freedom, etc) 
fh_association Freedom House (2008) associational and organizational rights subscore. (0-16; higher 
indicates more freedom, etc) 
fh_ruleoflaw Freedom House (2008) rule of law subscore. (0-16; higher indicates more freedom, etc) 
fh_autonomy Freedom House (2008) personal autonomy and individual rights subscore. (0-16; 
higher indicates more freedom, etc) 
wb_stability World Bank (2008) governance indicator - political stability. (Mean of 0, standard 
deviation of 1; higher values indicates better governance). wb_stability_pos  = wb_stability+3, to 
make positive to allow for interaction.  
wb_effective World Bank (2008) governance indicator - government effectiveness. (Mean of 0, 
standard deviation of 1; higher values indicates better governance). wb_effective_pos = 
wb_effective+3.  
wb_regulatory World Bank (2008) governance indicator – regulatory quality. (Mean of 0, standard 
deviation of 1; higher values indicates better governance). wb_regulatory_pos = wb_regulatory+3.  
wb_ruleoflaw World Bank (2008) governance indicator – rule of law.  (Mean of 0, standard deviation 
of 1; higher values indicates better governance). wb_ruleoflaw_pos = wb_ruleoflaw+3.  
wb_corruption World Bank (2008) governance indicator – control of corruption. Mean of 0, standard 
deviation of 1; higher values indicates better governance). wb_corruprion_pos = wb_corruption+3. 
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legalorigins_uk, legalorigins_fr, legalorigins_ge, legalorigins_sc, legalorigins_so Legal origins, 
British, French, German, Scandinavian, Socialist. Dummy 1=yes. From La Porta et al (2008). 
plurality Plurality/majoritarian electoral system dummy. Mixed systems and countries without direct 
elections coded as 0. From Institute for Democracy and Electoral assistance classification (IDEA 
2005). 
jud_rev Judicial review. Following methodology of La Porta et al (2004), updated and expanded with 
information from Maddex (2008) and national constitutions. Expanded from Maddex (2008) and other 
sources.  
rigid Constitutional rigidity. Following methodology of La Porta et al (2004), updated and expanded 
with information from Maddex (2008) and national constitutions. 
system Parliamentary or presidential system. (2=parliamentary, 1=elected assembly president, 0-
presidential) From Beck et al (2001). 
bicameral Bicameral Legislature dummy from Johnson &Wallack (2007).  
ethnic_frac Ethnic fractionalization. From Alesina et al (2003). (0-1; higher scores more 
fractionalized) 
language_frac Linguistic fractionalization. From Alesina et al (2003). (0-1; higher scores more 
fractionalized) 
religion_frac Religious fractionalization. From Alesina et al (2003). (0-1; higher scores more 
fractionalized) 
latitude_abs Absolute average latitude, from CIA factbook [in base 10, i.e. degrees + (minutes/60)] 
dictator Dictatorship dummy = 1 if type of government from Maddex (2008) is (non-constitutional) 
monarchy, dictatorship, theocratic republic, military government. If not listed in Maddex, =1 if 
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dictatorship, monarchy, emirate, communist state, military junta, theocratic republic, Islamic republic 
in CIA World factbook, (+ UAE).   
injud Independence of the judiciary (0-2) for 2007 from Cingranelli and Richards (2008).  
physint Physical integrity rights index for 2007 from Cingranelli and Richards (2008). 
association Freedom of association for 2007 from Cingranelli and Richards (2008).  
relfre Religious freedom for 2007 from Cingranelli and Richards (2008). 
africa, latin_am, north_am, asia, europe, oceania Dummy variables for region, based on UN 
classification. Latin_am includes South America, Central America, and the Caribbean.    
federal Federal system dummy, based on information from Maddex (2008) and the CIA World 
Factbook. (1 = federal or quasi-federal; 0 = unitary)  
 
Interactions  
Judicial jud_rev * injud – measure of effective judicial review.  
censor_rigid, censor_judrev, censor_judicial, press_rigid, press_judrev, press_judicial 
Interactions between both constitutional variables (censor and press) and rigid, jud_rev, and judicial – 
to check if judicial review enforces parchment rules. 
censor_ruleoflaw, press_ruleoflaw Interaction between both constitutional variables and 
wb_ruleoflaw_pos, to check if parchment matters when government respects law.  
censor_effective, press_effective Interaction between both constitutional variables and 
wb_effective_pos, wb_regulatory_pos, wb_corruption_pos  – to check effect of parchment in well-
functioning vs poorly-functioning countries. 
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censor_assocation, censor_autonomy, censor_physint, censor_relfre, press_association, 
press_autonomy, press_physint, press_relfre Interaction between both constitutional variables and 
fh_association;  fh_autonomy; physint; relfre  - to check if parchment protects specific liberties when 
they would otherwise be restricted (assuming that governments wishing to crack down on freedom of 
association, etc would wish to crack down on freedom of the press).  
censor_dict. Press_dict Interaction between both constitutional variables and dictator – to check if 
dictators respond differently to constitutional constraints.  
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Appendix Two 
Full Regression Results for Chapter Two 
Description Variable rsfindex rsf_10 rsf_20 rsf_round
2 
Constitution prohibits censorship  censor -15.5285 -5.387236 -1.780159 -1.359787 
  (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.185) (0.325) 
Constitution guarantees press 
freedom 
press -6.83121 1.846098 0.8447779 -1.826864 
  (0.356) (0.586) (0.735) (0.453) 
Constitutional rigidity rigid -3.30466 -0.7575211 -0.4182322 -0.8389507 
  (0.182) (0.481) (0.613) (0.264) 
Judicial review jud_rev -7.37067 -2.402487 -1.690257 -1.169442 
  (0.019)** (0.006)*** (0.058)* (0.209) 
Judicial independence injud -0.50702 -0.4550784 -0.2865044 -0.2970971 
  (0.882) (0.730) (0.775) (0.756) 
Plurality electoral system plurality 4.871623 1.959723 0.8239569 0.8995984 
  (0.047)** (0.009)*** (0.179) (0.145) 
Dictatorship dictator -10.4186 -3.603375 -2.149076 -1.704775 
  (0.168) (0.145) (0.248) (0.398) 
Bicameral legislature bicameral 1.944788 1.573275 1.180668 0.9624201 
  (0.273) (0.007)*** (0.040)** (0.054)* 
Parliamentary sytem system -3.10687 -1.245983 -1.038949 -1.146248 
  (0.007)*** (0.014)** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** 
GDP per capita  gdp -0.00029 -0.0001093 -0.0000946 -0.0000937 
  (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Age of constitution age_const 0.040046 0.0120377 0.0127337 0.0099458 
  (0.036)** (0.462) (0.079)* (0.089)* 
Physical integrity rights  physint -4.05703 -1.338471 -0.9409542 -0.7826334 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.009)*** 
Religious freedom relfre 2.437531 1.103513 0.1049773 -0.0626403 
  (0.417) (0.302) (0.923) (0.950) 
Functioning electoral process  electoral -0.88718 -0.1702824 -0.1411834 -0.1031308 
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  (0.313) (0.535) (0.578) (0.687) 
Political pluralism and 
participation 
fh_plural -0.85318 -0.3932254 -0.244432 -0.2493416 
  (0.238) (0.020)** (0.271) (0.253) 
Freedom of association fh_association -4.41792 -1.505901 -1.330055 -1.120331 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Personal autonomy and 
individual rights 
fh_autonomy 1.54415 0.266203 0.2689515 0.2192176 
  (0.053)* (0.238) (0.135) (0.246) 
Government effectiveness wb_effective 9.650104 1.895988 1.805289 2.28316 
  (0.028)** (0.165) (0.135) (0.095) 
Regulatory quality wb_regulatory -14.7851 -2.930087 -3.193759 -3.528185 
  (0.000)*** (0.022)** (0.010)** (0.010) 
Rule of law wb_ruleoflaw -8.0557 -2.619414 -2.13174 -2.010989 
  (0.059)* (0.066)* (0.135) (0.174) 
Control of corruption wb_corruption 14.42035 5.590959 4.353779 3.438491 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.018)** 
German legal origins legalorigins_ge 3.517589 1.388722 1.332003 0.8025939 
  (0.138) (0.217) (0.089)* (0.183) 
Ethnic fractionalization ethnic_frac -5.10693 -0.3444986 -1.572943 -2.295941 
  (0.229) (0.838) (0.256) (0.079)* 
Religious fractionalization religion_frac -7.08831 -3.50846 -2.681207 -1.803548 
  (0.117) (0.020)** (0.026)** (0.120) 
Absolute latitude latitude_abs -0.23689 -0.0899194 -0.1220052 -0.1092962 
  (0.025)** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
In Africa africa -6.24832 -1.476395 -1.912415 -2.048965 
  (0.058)* (0.120) (0.012)** (0.012)** 
In Latin America latin_am -6.6806 -2.076129 -3.071924 -3.344214 
  (0.084)* (0.119) (0.052)* (0.033)** 
In Europe europe 3.816556 -0.4263636 0.2294086 0.2067121 
  (0.086)* (0.550) (0.738) (0.770) 
In Oceania oceania -5.20815 -35.31598 -2.837101 -1.573704 
  (0.291) (0.000)*** (0.048)** (0.298) 
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Interaction: constitutional 
prohibits censorship * judicial 
review 
censor_judrev 5.664842 1.765729 1.310671 0.8572062 
  (0.004)*** (0.021)** (0.024)** (0.149) 
Interaction: constitution 
guarantees press freedom * 
constitutional rigidity 
press_rigid 2.801103 0.5963958 0.4902594 0.766442 
  (0.198) (0.507) (0.492) (0.284) 
Interaction: constitutional 
prohibits Censorship * effective 
judicial review 
censor_judicial -2.62703 -1.088758 -0.7129651 -0.5319672 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.045) 
Interaction: constitutional 
guarantees press freedom * 
effective jud. Review 
press_judicial -1.59005 -0.8329569 -0.2834118 -0.2081564 
  (0.140) (0.186) (0.403) (0.572) 
Effective judicial review (judicial 
review * judicial independence) 
judicial 6.692649 2.774427 1.592397 1.122874 
  (0.004)*** (0.048)** (0.021)** (0.121) 
Interaction: constitution 
guarantees press freedom * 
dictatorship 
press_dictator 14.14109 2.985262 2.107464 2.482373 
  (0.023)** (0.213) (0.246) (0.195) 
Interaction: constitution prohibits 
censorship * government 
effectiveness 
censor_effective -5.28417 -1.231046 -1.556122 -1.406685 
  (0.009)*** (0.240) (0.034)** (0.051)* 
Interaction: constitution prohibits 
censorship * regulatory quality 
censor_regulatory 9.57178 2.5141 1.946914 1.877308 
  (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.015)** (0.042)** 
Interaction: constitution guarantees 
press freedom * control of corruption 
press_corruption -4.04274 -2.485171 -1.702165 -0.9700899 
  (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.037)** 
Interaction: constitution prohibits 
censorship * electoral process 
censor_electoral -0.68447 -0.0304714 -0.0781621 -0.0181749 
  (0.086)* (0.831) (0.593) (0.902) 
Interaction: constitution guarantees 
press freedom * freedom of assoc. 
press_association 2.19318 0.8324951 0.6029516 0.5264636 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Interaction: constitution prohibits 
censorship * physical integrity rights 
censor_phyint 0.61211 0.3120633 0.0780656 -0.0188668 
  (0.299) (0.201) (0.661) (0.912) 
Interaction: constitution guarantees 
press freedom * religious freedom 
press_relfre -3.75167 -2.132804 -1.065486 -0.812133 
  (0.152) (0.034)** (0.312) (0.387) 
 
 
n=129 
p values in parentheses 
rsfindex = additive robust OLS regression; R2=0.9223; P>F=0.000; Mean VIF=23.68   
rsf_10 = 10 category robust ordered logit; Pseudo R2=0.6256; P>Chi2=0.000;  
rsf_20 = 20 category robust ordered logit; Pseudo R2=0.5165; P>Chi2=0.000;  
rsf_round2 = rounded robust ordered logit ; Pseudo R2=0.4057; P>Chi2=0.000;  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
p-values are not corrected to account for general-to-specific reduction. 
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